From: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, hch@infradead.org, serue@us.ibm.com,
viro@ftp.linux.org.uk, kzak@redhat.com
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
containers@lists.osdl.org, util-linux-ng@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [patch 05/10] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged bind mounts
Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2008 13:31:52 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080116123429.815186485@szeredi.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20080116123147.466284860@szeredi.hu
[-- Attachment #1: unprivileged-mounts-allow-unprivileged-bind-mounts.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2541 bytes --]
From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Allow bind mounts to unprivileged users if the following conditions are met:
- mountpoint is not a symlink
- parent mount is owned by the user
- the number of user mounts is below the maximum
Unprivileged mounts imply MS_SETUSER, and will also have the "nosuid" and
"nodev" mount flags set.
In particular, if mounting process doesn't have CAP_SETUID capability,
then the "nosuid" flag will be added, and if it doesn't have CAP_MKNOD
capability, then the "nodev" flag will be added.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
Index: linux/fs/namespace.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/namespace.c 2008-01-16 13:25:07.000000000 +0100
+++ linux/fs/namespace.c 2008-01-16 13:25:08.000000000 +0100
@@ -511,6 +511,11 @@ static void __set_mnt_user(struct vfsmou
WARN_ON(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_USER);
mnt->mnt_uid = current->fsuid;
mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_USER;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SETUID))
+ mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID;
+ if (!capable(CAP_MKNOD))
+ mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
}
static void set_mnt_user(struct vfsmount *mnt)
@@ -1021,22 +1026,26 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oldumount(char __use
#endif
-static int mount_is_safe(struct nameidata *nd)
+/*
+ * Conditions for unprivileged mounts are:
+ * - mountpoint is not a symlink
+ * - mountpoint is in a mount owned by the user
+ */
+static bool permit_mount(struct nameidata *nd, int *flags)
{
+ struct inode *inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
+
if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return 0;
- return -EPERM;
-#ifdef notyet
- if (S_ISLNK(nd->path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
- return -EPERM;
- if (nd->path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) {
- if (current->uid != nd->path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid)
- return -EPERM;
- }
- if (vfs_permission(nd, MAY_WRITE))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
-#endif
+ return true;
+
+ if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!is_mount_owner(nd->path.mnt, current->fsuid))
+ return false;
+
+ *flags |= MS_SETUSER;
+ return true;
}
static int lives_below_in_same_fs(struct dentry *d, struct dentry *dentry)
@@ -1280,9 +1289,10 @@ static int do_loopback(struct nameidata
int clone_fl;
struct nameidata old_nd;
struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL;
- int err = mount_is_safe(nd);
- if (err)
- return err;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!permit_mount(nd, &flags))
+ return -EPERM;
if (!old_name || !*old_name)
return -EINVAL;
err = path_lookup(old_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_nd);
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-01-16 12:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-01-16 12:31 [patch 00/10] mount ownership and unprivileged mount syscall (v7) Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 01/10] unprivileged mounts: add user mounts to the kernel Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 02/10] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged umount Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 03/10] unprivileged mounts: propagate error values from clone_mnt Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 04/10] unprivileged mounts: account user mounts Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` Miklos Szeredi [this message]
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 06/10] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged mounts Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 07/10] unprivileged mounts: add sysctl tunable for "safe" property Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-21 20:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-21 21:37 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-22 20:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-22 22:59 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-23 0:00 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 08/10] unprivileged mounts: make fuse safe Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-21 20:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 09/10] unprivileged mounts: propagation: inherit owner from parent Miklos Szeredi
2008-01-21 20:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-01-16 12:31 ` [patch 10/10] unprivileged mounts: add "no submounts" flag Miklos Szeredi
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2008-02-05 21:36 [patch 00/10] mount ownership and unprivileged mount syscall (v8) Miklos Szeredi
2008-02-05 21:36 ` [patch 05/10] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged bind mounts Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-27 12:04 [patch 00/10] mount ownership and unprivileged mount syscall (v5) Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-27 12:04 ` [patch 05/10] unprivileged mounts: allow unprivileged bind mounts Miklos Szeredi
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