From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: [x86.git#mm] stack protector fixes, vmsplice exploit
Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2008 18:00:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080214170058.GA2043@elte.hu> (raw)
update: latest x86.git#mm has a pretty much working stack-protector
feature - you can pick it up for testing via:
http://people.redhat.com/mingo/x86.git/README
as pageexec@freemail.hu has indicated it already in his analysis and
patch, there were multiple bugs hitting us here. The amount and scope of
these problems show structural problems in how security in this area was
approached. So with these changes we try to go deeper than just
minimally fixing the feature. We've got 15 changes so far in and around
this area:
x86: fix execve with -fstack-protect
x86: exclude vsyscall files from stackprotect
x86: fix stackprotect Makefile rule
x86: fix stackprotector canary updates during context switches
panic: print more informative messages on stackprotect failure
panic: print out stacktrace if DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
x86: enable stack-protector by default
x86: setup stack canary for the idle threads
x86: fix canary of the boot CPU's idle task
stackprotector: include files
stackprotector: add boot_init_stack_canary()
x86: fix the stackprotector canary of the boot CPU
x86: stackprotector: mix TSC to the boot canary
x86: test the presence of the stackprotector
x86: streamline stackprotector
but we've not completed this work yet. We'll push the independent bits
to Linus ASAP.
Ingo
next reply other threads:[~2008-02-14 17:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-02-14 17:00 Ingo Molnar [this message]
2008-02-14 17:16 ` [x86.git#mm] stack protector fixes, vmsplice exploit pageexec
2008-02-14 19:00 ` Ingo Molnar
2008-02-14 18:55 ` pageexec
2008-02-14 20:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2008-02-14 21:00 ` Arjan van de Ven
2008-02-14 21:12 ` pageexec
2008-02-14 22:35 ` Jakub Jelinek
2008-02-14 21:43 ` pageexec
2008-02-14 23:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2008-02-14 23:16 ` Ingo Molnar
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