Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup

Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-07T21:32:31Z

Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@schaufler-ca.com):
>
> --- Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
>
> >
> > On Fri, 2008-03-07 at 12:30 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > Quoting Casey Schaufler (casey@schaufler-ca.com):
> > > >
> > > > --- "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > ...
> > > > >
> > > > > Until user namespaces are complete, selinux seems the only good
> > solution
> > > > > to offer isolation.
> > > >
> > > > Smack does it better and cheaper. (Unless you define good==selinux)
> > > > (insert smiley)
> > >
> > > Ah, thanks - I hadn't looked into it, but yes IIUC smack should
> > > definately work. I'll have to give that a shot.
> >
> > Not if you want to confine uid 0. smack doesn't control capabilities,
> > even the ones used to override it.
> >
> > So you'd have to at least configure your per-process bset and file caps
> > rather carefully. And even then you have to watch out for things with
> > CAP_MAC* or CAP_SETPCAP.
>
> Shrug. As if getting 800,000 lines of policy definition
> for a thousand applications completely correct is going to be easier.

Folks, as I get time I will try with both :)

I suspect the CAP_MAC_ADMIN will mean containers won't be able to do any
policy updates without an update to smack to do a CAP_NS_OVERRIDE type
of thing. For SELinux I've got my hopes on the userspace policy daemon,
but first (my next step atm) I need to get the namespace thing going
(vserver1.root_t etc).

-serge