Re: [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_create

Toshiharu Harada
2008-06-02T15:31:29Z

2008/6/3 Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru>:
> On Mon, Jun 02, 2008 at 12:55:33PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi (miklos@szeredi.hu) wrote:
>> Oh, I've been told. But valid technical reason given? No.
>
> This is a really interesting flame, can you proceed,
> we will run for cola and peanuts :)

Let me quote a message by Chris Wright from LSM ml:
"You cannot discover the path used to access an inode without knowing
both the dentry and the vfsmount objects. "

Another one by Stephen Smalley:
"Pathname-based security considered harmful. You want to control access
to an object, not a name, and the name-to-object mapping is neither
one-to-one nor immutable."

Can you guess when they were posted?
The answer is December 2003. :)
Do we need more time? I don't think so.

I'm viewing Miklos' patches as *enhancements* not only for AppArmor (and
other pathname-based LSM modules). Everyone can make use of
information and lose nothing. Am I too simple minded?

> For the technical reason: in case of stackable/bind, which path should
> be checked? Whatever answer is, there will always be another party,
> which wants different behaviour.

--
Toshiharu Harada
haradats@gmail.com