From: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, eparis@redhat.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, agruen@suse.de, jjohansen@suse.de,
penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp, hch@infradead.org,
viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [patch 12/15] security: pass path to inode_setxattr
Date: Thu, 29 May 2008 15:49:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080529135013.166912240@szeredi.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20080529134903.615127628@szeredi.hu
[-- Attachment #1: security_setxattr_path.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 8126 bytes --]
From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
In the inode_setxattr() security operation and related functions pass
the path (vfsmount + dentry) instead of the dentry. AppArmor will need
this.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
---
fs/xattr.c | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 12 ++++++------
security/commoncap.c | 2 +-
security/dummy.c | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 6 +++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 ++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++++---
7 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
Index: linux-2.6/fs/xattr.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/fs/xattr.c 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6/fs/xattr.c 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct path *path, const ch
return error;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
- error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ error = security_inode_setxattr(path, name, value, size, flags);
if (error)
goto out;
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
Index: linux-2.6/include/linux/security.h
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/include/linux/security.h 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6/include/linux/security.h 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ extern void cap_capset_set(struct task_s
extern int cap_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
extern void cap_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe);
extern int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct path *path, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opt
* inode.
* @inode_setxattr:
* Check permission before setting the extended attributes
- * @value identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * @value identified by @name for @path.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @inode_post_setxattr:
* Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation.
@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*inode_setattr) (struct path *path, struct iattr *attr);
int (*inode_getattr) (struct path *path);
void (*inode_delete) (struct inode *inode);
- int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ int (*inode_setxattr) (struct path *path, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
void (*inode_post_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
@@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct ino
int security_inode_setattr(struct path *path, struct iattr *attr);
int security_inode_getattr(struct path *path);
void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode);
-int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+int security_inode_setxattr(struct path *path, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
@@ -2048,10 +2048,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_getattr
static inline void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode)
{ }
-static inline int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
+static inline int security_inode_setxattr(struct path *path,
const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- return cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ return cap_inode_setxattr(path, name, value, size, flags);
}
static inline void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
Index: linux-2.6/security/dummy.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/security/dummy.c 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6/security/dummy.c 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
@@ -363,8 +363,8 @@ static void dummy_inode_delete (struct i
return;
}
-static int dummy_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
- const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+static int dummy_inode_setxattr(struct path *path, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
Index: linux-2.6/security/security.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/security/security.c 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6/security/security.c 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
@@ -493,12 +493,12 @@ void security_inode_delete(struct inode
security_ops->inode_delete(inode);
}
-int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+int security_inode_setxattr(struct path *path, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ return security_ops->inode_setxattr(path, name, value, size, flags);
}
void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
Index: linux-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/security/selinux/hooks.c 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6/security/selinux/hooks.c 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
@@ -2622,10 +2622,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(s
return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
}
-static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct path *path, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
Index: linux-2.6/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/security/smack/smack_lsm.c 2008-05-29 12:20:57.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6/security/smack/smack_lsm.c 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct pa
/**
* smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
- * @dentry: the object
+ * @path: the object
* @name: name of the attribute
* @value: unused
* @size: unused
@@ -573,9 +573,10 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(struct pa
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct path *path, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
+ struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
int rc = 0;
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
@@ -584,7 +585,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct d
if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
rc = -EPERM;
} else
- rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ rc = cap_inode_setxattr(path, name, value, size, flags);
if (rc == 0)
rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
Index: linux-2.6/security/commoncap.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.orig/security/commoncap.c 2008-05-29 12:20:15.000000000 +0200
+++ linux-2.6/security/commoncap.c 2008-05-29 12:20:58.000000000 +0200
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_bi
current->egid != current->gid);
}
-int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+int cap_inode_setxattr(struct path *path, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-05-29 13:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-05-29 13:49 [patch 00/15] security: pass path instead of inode to security ops Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 01/15] security: pass path to inode_create Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-31 8:30 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-05-31 10:48 ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-06-01 20:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 6:01 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 7:02 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 9:13 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 9:32 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 9:36 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 9:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 10:42 ` Christoph Hellwig
2008-06-02 10:55 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 11:04 ` Pekka Enberg
2008-06-02 11:13 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 15:05 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2008-06-02 15:31 ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-06-02 15:51 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2008-06-02 16:29 ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-06-02 16:52 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2008-06-02 23:37 ` Toshiharu Harada
2008-06-03 6:08 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 18:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-06-02 10:04 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2008-06-02 11:23 ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-06-02 11:34 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 11:52 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-06-02 12:32 ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-06-02 12:45 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2008-06-02 12:49 ` Matthew Wilcox
2008-06-02 13:24 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2008-06-14 8:27 ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-06-03 13:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-06-04 5:09 ` Tetsuo Handa
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 02/15] security: pass path to inode_mknod Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 03/15] security: pass path to inode_mkdir Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 04/15] security: pass path to inode_rmdir Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 05/15] security: pass path to inode_unlink Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 06/15] security: pass path to inode_symlink Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 07/15] security: pass path to inode_link Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 08/15] security: pass path to inode_rename Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 09/15] security: pass path to inode_setattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 10/15] security: pass path to inode_getxattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 11/15] security: pass path to inode_listxattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` Miklos Szeredi [this message]
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 13/15] security: pass path to inode_removexattr Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 14/15] vfs: more path_permission() conversions Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-29 13:49 ` [patch 15/15] security: pass path to inode_permission Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-30 13:37 ` [patch 00/15] security: pass path instead of inode to security ops Tetsuo Handa
2008-05-30 17:17 ` Miklos Szeredi
2008-05-31 0:33 ` Tetsuo Handa
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