From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org, vegard.nossum@gmail.com,
ebiederm@xmission.com
Subject: Re: + utsname-completely-overwrite-prior-information.patch added to -mm tree
Date: Sat, 13 Sep 2008 20:40:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080914014024.GA18604@us.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200809122211.m8CMBbAM007090@imap1.linux-foundation.org>
Quoting akpm@linux-foundation.org (akpm@linux-foundation.org):
>
> The patch titled
> utsname: completely overwrite prior information
> has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
> utsname-completely-overwrite-prior-information.patch
>
> Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
> a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
> b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
> c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
> reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
>
> *** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***
>
> See http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/added-to-mm.txt to find
> out what to do about this
>
> The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
>
> ------------------------------------------------------
> Subject: utsname: completely overwrite prior information
> From: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
>
> On sethostname() and setdomainname(), previous information may be retained
> if it was longer than than the new hostname/domainname.
>
> This can be demonstrated trivially by calling sethostname() first with a
> long name, then with a short name, and then calling uname() to retrieve
> the full buffer that contains the hostname (and possibly parts of the old
> hostname), one just has to look past the terminating zero.
>
> I don't know if we should really care that much (hence the RFC); the only
> scenarios I can possibly think of is administrator putting something
> sensitive in the hostname (or domain name) by accident, and changing it
> back will not undo the mistake entirely, though it's not like we can
> recover gracefully from "rm -rf /" either... The other scenario is
> namespaces (CLONE_NEWUTS) where some information may be unintentionally
> "inherited" from the previous namespace (a program wants to hide the
> original name and does clone + sethostname, but some information is still
> left).
>
> I think the patch may be defended on grounds of the principle of least
> surprise. But I am not adamant :-)
>
> (I guess the question now is whether userspace should be able to
> write embedded NULs into the buffer or not...)
>
> At least the observation has been made and the patch has been presented.
>
> Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@gmail.com>
> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Agreed it seems an implausible attack vector :) But especially for
something as rare as setting a hostname, seems worthwhile.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Thanks, Vegard.
-serge
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> ---
>
> kernel/sys.c | 6 ++++--
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff -puN kernel/sys.c~utsname-completely-overwrite-prior-information kernel/sys.c
> --- a/kernel/sys.c~utsname-completely-overwrite-prior-information
> +++ a/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -1416,7 +1416,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_sethostname(char __u
> errno = -EFAULT;
> if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
> memcpy(utsname()->nodename, tmp, len);
> - utsname()->nodename[len] = 0;
> + memset(utsname()->nodename + len, 0,
> + sizeof(utsname()->nodename) - len);
> errno = 0;
> }
> up_write(&uts_sem);
> @@ -1462,7 +1463,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setdomainname(char _
> errno = -EFAULT;
> if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) {
> memcpy(utsname()->domainname, tmp, len);
> - utsname()->domainname[len] = 0;
> + memset(utsname()->domainname + len, 0,
> + sizeof(utsname()->domainname) - len);
> errno = 0;
> }
> up_write(&uts_sem);
> _
>
> Patches currently in -mm which might be from vegard.nossum@gmail.com are
>
> origin.patch
> linux-next.patch
> ia64-avoid-invoking-irq-handlers-on-offline-cpus.patch
> utsname-completely-overwrite-prior-information.patch
> kernel-sysc-improve-code-generation.patch
>
> --
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parent reply other threads:[~2008-09-14 1:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
[parent not found: <200809122211.m8CMBbAM007090@imap1.linux-foundation.org>]
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