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From: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2008 16:49:03 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080924234857.GA22375@sequoia.sous-sol.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080924020526.GA26058@us.ibm.com>

* Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com) wrote:
> Remove the option to compile the kernel without file capabilities.  Not
> compiling file capabilities actually makes the kernel less safe, as it
> includes the possibility for a task changing another task's capabilities.
> 
> Some are concerned that userspace tools (and user education) are not
> up to the task of properly configuring file capabilities on a system.
> For those cases, there is now the ability to boot with the no_file_caps
> boot option.  This will prevent file capabilities from being used in
> the capabilities recalculation at exec, but will not change the rest
> of the kernel behavior which used to be switchable using the
> CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES option.

(note: defconfig has CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y)
   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
6805157 1018344  671900 8495401  81a129 obj64-defconfig/vmlinux
6805151 1018368  671900 8495419  81a13b obj64-defconfig-patch1/vmlinux
6805151 1018368  671900 8495419  81a13b obj64-defconfig-patch2/vmlinux
6804605 1018344  671900 8494849  819f01 obj64-nofcap/vmlinux
6804604 1018344  671900 8494848  819f00 obj64-nofcap-patch1/vmlinux
6805150 1018368  671900 8495418  81a13a obj64-nofcap-patch2/vmlinux

The last 2 show the real diff now, add 570 bytes by effectively forcing
CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES on.

What is being done to enable userspace in distros to make those 570
bytes generally useful?

thanks,
-chris

  parent reply	other threads:[~2008-09-24 23:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-09-24  2:04 [PATCH 1/2] file capabilities: add no_file_caps switch (v3) Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-24  2:05 ` [PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-24  4:59   ` Andrew G. Morgan
2008-09-24 23:49   ` Chris Wright [this message]
2008-09-25  1:02     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-25  1:19       ` Chris Wright
2008-09-25  1:36       ` Andreas Gruenbacher

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