From: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>,
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2008 18:19:45 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20080925011945.GA23181@sequoia.sous-sol.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080925010233.GB7324@us.ibm.com>
* Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com) wrote:
> Quoting Chris Wright (chrisw@sous-sol.org):
> > * Serge E. Hallyn (serue@us.ibm.com) wrote:
> > > Remove the option to compile the kernel without file capabilities. Not
> > > compiling file capabilities actually makes the kernel less safe, as it
> > > includes the possibility for a task changing another task's capabilities.
> > >
> > > Some are concerned that userspace tools (and user education) are not
> > > up to the task of properly configuring file capabilities on a system.
> > > For those cases, there is now the ability to boot with the no_file_caps
> > > boot option. This will prevent file capabilities from being used in
> > > the capabilities recalculation at exec, but will not change the rest
> > > of the kernel behavior which used to be switchable using the
> > > CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES option.
> >
> > (note: defconfig has CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y)
> > text data bss dec hex filename
> > 6805157 1018344 671900 8495401 81a129 obj64-defconfig/vmlinux
> > 6805151 1018368 671900 8495419 81a13b obj64-defconfig-patch1/vmlinux
> > 6805151 1018368 671900 8495419 81a13b obj64-defconfig-patch2/vmlinux
> > 6804605 1018344 671900 8494849 819f01 obj64-nofcap/vmlinux
> > 6804604 1018344 671900 8494848 819f00 obj64-nofcap-patch1/vmlinux
> > 6805150 1018368 671900 8495418 81a13a obj64-nofcap-patch2/vmlinux
>
> (what are you using to get these numbers?)
Just building w/ O=obj64... and then using "size obj64-*/vmlinux"
> > The last 2 show the real diff now, add 570 bytes by effectively forcing
> > CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES on.
>
> That surprises me - I thought a reasonable amount of code was cut as
> well. Sounds like it may be worth it to refactor some of the code.
Be nice to cut it down if you can.
> > What is being done to enable userspace in distros to make those 570
> > bytes generally useful?
>
> Fedora 9 and ubuntu intrepid already have full capabilities support and
> modern libcap. Sles is set to ship with a modern libcap, and according
> to what Andreas is saying, if we can provide them with the no_file_caps
> boot option then suse is willing to have a kernel with capabilities
> turned on. I think gentoo still comes with libcap-1. Need to look into
> changing that.
>
> I suppose the next baby-step will be to do get rid of setuid on little
> things like ping. Actually using inheritable caps for pseudo-admin
> 'roles' may be a bit farther off, and a particularly interesting problem
> will be to take huge pieces of cross-os software like ssh which make
> assumptions about setuid behavior, and find ways to make them work
> correctly with capabilities, with capabilities in
> SECURE_NOROOT|SECURE_NOSETUIDFIXUP, and with non-linux oses.
The baby step including simple things like setuid ping was the step I was
thinking of. That w/ embedded and bloatwatch in mind is why I asked.
thanks,
-chris
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-09-25 1:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-09-24 2:04 [PATCH 1/2] file capabilities: add no_file_caps switch (v3) Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-24 2:05 ` [PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-24 4:59 ` Andrew G. Morgan
2008-09-24 23:49 ` Chris Wright
2008-09-25 1:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-09-25 1:19 ` Chris Wright [this message]
2008-09-25 1:36 ` Andreas Gruenbacher
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20080925011945.GA23181@sequoia.sous-sol.org \
--to=chrisw@sous-sol.org \
--cc=agruen@suse.de \
--cc=akpm@osdl.org \
--cc=jmorris@redhat.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=morgan@kernel.org \
--cc=randy.dunlap@oracle.com \
--cc=serue@us.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox