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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, arnd@arndb.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@sisk.pl>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/2] first callers of process_deny_checkpoint()
Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2008 10:46:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20081010084614.GA319@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1223585671.11830.40.camel@nimitz>


* Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:

> On Thu, 2008-10-09 at 14:43 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Hmm, I don't know too much about aio, but is it possible to succeed with
> > io_getevents if we didn't first do a submit?  It looks like the contexts
> > are looked up out of current->mm, so I don't think we need this call
> > here.
> > 
> > Otherwise, this is neat.
> 
> Good question.  I know nothing, either. :)
> 
> My thought was that any process *trying* to do aio stuff of any kind 
> is going to be really confused if it gets checkpointed.  Or, it might 
> try to submit an aio right after it checks the list of them.  I 
> thought it best to be cautious and say, if you screw with aio, no 
> checkpointing for you!

as long as there's total transparency and the transition from CR-capable 
to CR-disabled state is absolutely safe and race-free, that should be 
fine.

I expect users to quickly cause enough pressure to reduce the NOCR areas 
of the kernel significantly ;-)

In the long run, could we expect a (experimental) version of hibernation 
that would just use this checkpointing facility to hibernate? That would 
be way cool for users and for testing: we could do transparent kernel 
upgrades/downgrades via this form of hibernation, between CR-compatible 
kernels (!).

distros could mark certain kernels as 'safe fallback' kernels, and if 
say a WARN_ON() or app breakage hits that is suspected to be kernel 
related, the user could hit a 'switch back to safe kernel' button - 
which would switch back _without losing any app state_.

People could even try new versions of the kernel which would just fall 
back to the known-workin safe kernel if the bootup fails for example.

Pie in the sky for sure, but way cool: it could propel Linux kernel 
testing to completely new areas - new kernels could be tried 
non-intrusively. (as long as a new kernel does not corrupt the CR data 
structures - so some good consistency and redundancy checking would be 
nice in the format!)

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2008-10-10  8:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-10-09 19:04 [RFC][PATCH 1/2] Track in-kernel when we expect checkpoint/restart to work Dave Hansen
2008-10-09 19:04 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/2] first callers of process_deny_checkpoint() Dave Hansen
2008-10-09 19:43   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-10-09 20:54     ` Dave Hansen
2008-10-10  8:46       ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2008-10-10 13:17         ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2008-10-10 14:54           ` Ingo Molnar
2008-10-10 19:53             ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2008-10-10 19:53               ` Ingo Molnar
2008-10-10 20:40                 ` Len Brown
2008-10-10 22:57                 ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2008-10-11 13:48         ` Pavel Machek
2008-10-11 15:00           ` Ingo Molnar
2008-10-10 10:27       ` Cedric Le Goater
2008-10-10  8:41   ` Daniel Lezcano
2008-10-10 10:17   ` Cedric Le Goater
2008-10-10 14:04     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-10-10 16:45       ` Greg Kurz
2008-10-10 17:13         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-10-10 17:28         ` Dave Hansen
2008-10-13  8:20           ` Greg Kurz
2008-10-10  8:20 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] Track in-kernel when we expect checkpoint/restart to work Greg Kurz
2008-10-10  8:37   ` Daniel Lezcano
2008-10-10  8:47     ` Greg Kurz
2008-10-10 10:11     ` Oren Laadan
2008-10-10 14:59     ` Ingo Molnar
2008-10-10 15:17       ` Oren Laadan
2008-10-10 15:28         ` Ingo Molnar
2008-10-10 16:34         ` Greg Kurz
2008-10-10 16:36           ` Dave Hansen
2008-10-10 20:57             ` Daniel Lezcano
2008-10-10 17:18           ` Chris Friesen
2008-10-13  8:18             ` Greg Kurz
2008-10-13 16:46               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-10-10 16:33     ` Dave Hansen

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