* [PATCH 2/2] ptrace: do not use task_lock() for attach
@ 2009-05-03 18:55 Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-03 18:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-04 19:09 ` Roland McGrath
0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2009-05-03 18:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton, Roland McGrath; +Cc: Jeff Dike, utrace-devel, linux-kernel
Remove the "Nasty, nasty" lock dance in ptrace_attach()/ptrace_traceme().
>From now task_lock() has nothing to do with ptrace at all.
With the recent changes nobody uses task_lock() to serialize with ptrace,
but in fact it was never needed and it was never used consistently.
However ptrace_attach() calls __ptrace_may_access() and needs task_lock()
to pin task->mm for get_dumpable(). But we can call __ptrace_may_access()
before we take tasklist_lock, ->cred_exec_mutex protects us against
do_execve() path which can change creds and MMF_DUMP* flags.
(ugly, but we can't use ptrace_may_access() because it hides the error
code, so we have to take task_lock() and use __ptrace_may_access()).
Also, kill "if (!task->mm)" check. It buys nothing, we can attach to the
task right before it does exit_mm(). Instead, add PF_KTHREAD check to
prevent attaching to the kernel thread with a borrowed ->mm.
What we need is to make sure we can't attach after exit_notify(), check
task->exit_state.
And finally, move ptrace_traceme() up near ptrace_attach() to keep them
close to each other.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------
1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
--- PTRACE/kernel/ptrace.c~2_ATTACH 2009-05-03 19:30:15.000000000 +0200
+++ PTRACE/kernel/ptrace.c 2009-05-03 19:57:11.000000000 +0200
@@ -177,66 +177,79 @@ bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struc
int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
{
int retval;
- unsigned long flags;
audit_ptrace(task);
retval = -EPERM;
+ if (unlikely(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+ goto out;
if (same_thread_group(task, current))
goto out;
-
- /* Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference;
+ /*
+ * Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference;
* SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently under ptrace.
*/
retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->cred_exec_mutex);
- if (retval < 0)
+ if (retval < 0)
goto out;
- retval = -EPERM;
-repeat:
- /*
- * Nasty, nasty.
- *
- * We want to hold both the task-lock and the
- * tasklist_lock for writing at the same time.
- * But that's against the rules (tasklist_lock
- * is taken for reading by interrupts on other
- * cpu's that may have task_lock).
- */
task_lock(task);
- if (!write_trylock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags)) {
- task_unlock(task);
- do {
- cpu_relax();
- } while (!write_can_lock(&tasklist_lock));
- goto repeat;
- }
-
- if (!task->mm)
- goto bad;
- /* the same process cannot be attached many times */
- if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
- goto bad;
retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+ task_unlock(task);
if (retval)
- goto bad;
+ goto unlock_creds;
- /* Go */
- task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
+ write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ retval = -EPERM;
+ if (unlikely(task->exit_state))
+ goto unlock_tasklist;
+ if (task->ptrace)
+ goto unlock_tasklist;
+
+ task->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
__ptrace_link(task, current);
send_sig_info(SIGSTOP, SEND_SIG_FORCED, task);
-bad:
- write_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklist_lock, flags);
- task_unlock(task);
+unlock_tasklist:
+ write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+unlock_creds:
mutex_unlock(&task->cred_exec_mutex);
out:
return retval;
}
+/**
+ * ptrace_traceme -- helper for PTRACE_TRACEME
+ *
+ * Performs checks and sets PT_PTRACED.
+ * Should be used by all ptrace implementations for PTRACE_TRACEME.
+ */
+int ptrace_traceme(void)
+{
+ int ret = -EPERM;
+
+ write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+ /* Are we already being traced? */
+ if (!current->ptrace) {
+ ret = security_ptrace_traceme(current->parent);
+ /*
+ * Check PF_EXITING to ensure ->real_parent has not passed
+ * exit_ptrace(). Otherwise we don't report the error but
+ * pretend ->real_parent untraces us right after return.
+ */
+ if (!ret && !(current->real_parent->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
+ current->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
+ __ptrace_link(current, current->real_parent);
+ }
+ }
+ write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Called with irqs disabled, returns true if childs should reap themselves.
*/
@@ -574,52 +587,6 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *c
}
/**
- * ptrace_traceme -- helper for PTRACE_TRACEME
- *
- * Performs checks and sets PT_PTRACED.
- * Should be used by all ptrace implementations for PTRACE_TRACEME.
- */
-int ptrace_traceme(void)
-{
- int ret = -EPERM;
-
- /*
- * Are we already being traced?
- */
-repeat:
- task_lock(current);
- if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)) {
- /*
- * See ptrace_attach() comments about the locking here.
- */
- unsigned long flags;
- if (!write_trylock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags)) {
- task_unlock(current);
- do {
- cpu_relax();
- } while (!write_can_lock(&tasklist_lock));
- goto repeat;
- }
-
- ret = security_ptrace_traceme(current->parent);
-
- /*
- * Check PF_EXITING to ensure ->real_parent has not passed
- * exit_ptrace(). Otherwise we don't report the error but
- * pretend ->real_parent untraces us right after return.
- */
- if (!ret && !(current->real_parent->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
- current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
- __ptrace_link(current, current->real_parent);
- }
-
- write_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklist_lock, flags);
- }
- task_unlock(current);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/**
* ptrace_get_task_struct -- grab a task struct reference for ptrace
* @pid: process id to grab a task_struct reference of
*
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] ptrace: do not use task_lock() for attach
2009-05-03 18:55 [PATCH 2/2] ptrace: do not use task_lock() for attach Oleg Nesterov
@ 2009-05-03 18:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-04 19:09 ` Roland McGrath
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2009-05-03 18:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Andrew Morton, Roland McGrath; +Cc: Jeff Dike, utrace-devel, linux-kernel
On 05/03, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>
> Remove the "Nasty, nasty" lock dance in ptrace_attach()/ptrace_traceme().
> From now task_lock() has nothing to do with ptrace at all.
>
> With the recent changes nobody uses task_lock() to serialize with ptrace,
> but in fact it was never needed and it was never used consistently.
arch/um still uses task_lock() to clear PT_DTRACE after exec, but this
should be fixed anyway.
UML shouldn't use PT_DTRACE at all, and nobody except ptrace should
change ptrace flags. arch/um/kernel/exec.c:execve1() is just buggy.
For example, it can race with exit_ptrace()->__ptrace_unlink() and
leak PT_ flags on untraced task.
Jeff, what do you think about the patch I sent you a week ago?
> kernel/ptrace.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------------
> 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
To simplify the review I am attaching the code with this patch applied,
int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
{
int retval;
audit_ptrace(task);
retval = -EPERM;
if (unlikely(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
goto out;
if (same_thread_group(task, current))
goto out;
/*
* Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference;
* SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently under ptrace.
*/
retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->cred_exec_mutex);
if (retval < 0)
goto out;
task_lock(task);
retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
task_unlock(task);
if (retval)
goto unlock_creds;
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
retval = -EPERM;
if (unlikely(task->exit_state))
goto unlock_tasklist;
if (task->ptrace)
goto unlock_tasklist;
task->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
task->ptrace |= PT_PTRACE_CAP;
__ptrace_link(task, current);
send_sig_info(SIGSTOP, SEND_SIG_FORCED, task);
unlock_tasklist:
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
unlock_creds:
mutex_unlock(&task->cred_exec_mutex);
out:
return retval;
}
int ptrace_traceme(void)
{
int ret = -EPERM;
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* Are we already being traced? */
if (!current->ptrace) {
ret = security_ptrace_traceme(current->parent);
/*
* Check PF_EXITING to ensure ->real_parent has not passed
* exit_ptrace(). Otherwise we don't report the error but
* pretend ->real_parent untraces us right after return.
*/
if (!ret && !(current->real_parent->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
current->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
__ptrace_link(current, current->real_parent);
}
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
return ret;
}
Oleg.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] ptrace: do not use task_lock() for attach
2009-05-03 18:55 [PATCH 2/2] ptrace: do not use task_lock() for attach Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-03 18:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
@ 2009-05-04 19:09 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-04 19:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Roland McGrath @ 2009-05-04 19:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Oleg Nesterov; +Cc: Andrew Morton, Jeff Dike, utrace-devel, linux-kernel
This looks good to me overall. It might be worth slicing it into two or
more patches, just for bisect paranoia. (e.g. PF_KTHREAD; task_lock in
ptrace_attach; task_lock in ptrace_traceme.)
I think it merits a comment that the PF_KTHREAD check does not need any
interlock because daemonize() will detach ptrace via reparent_to_kthreadd()
after it sets PF_KTHREAD. (vs the old ->mm check under task_lock.)
It is worth noting that this changes the security_ptrace_traceme() call so
it's no longer under task_lock(). I can't see any way the LSM hooks care,
but it is a change.
You also didn't mention the s/|=/=/ changes. Those are correct, we've
already agreed, but the commit log should mention that this subtle change
was intentional.
Thanks,
Roland
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] ptrace: do not use task_lock() for attach
2009-05-04 19:09 ` Roland McGrath
@ 2009-05-04 19:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2009-05-04 19:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Roland McGrath; +Cc: Andrew Morton, Jeff Dike, utrace-devel, linux-kernel
On 05/04, Roland McGrath wrote:
>
> This looks good to me overall. It might be worth slicing it into two or
> more patches, just for bisect paranoia. (e.g. PF_KTHREAD; task_lock in
> ptrace_attach; task_lock in ptrace_traceme.)
OK,
> I think it merits a comment that the PF_KTHREAD check does not need any
> interlock because daemonize() will detach ptrace via reparent_to_kthreadd()
> after it sets PF_KTHREAD. (vs the old ->mm check under task_lock.)
Agreed, but actually the patch doesn't make the difference wrt daemonize().
currently ptrace_attach() can take task_lock() just before daemonize() calls
exit_mm().
> It is worth noting that this changes the security_ptrace_traceme() call so
> it's no longer under task_lock(). I can't see any way the LSM hooks care,
> but it is a change.
Yes, good point.
> You also didn't mention the s/|=/=/ changes. Those are correct, we've
> already agreed, but the commit log should mention that this subtle change
> was intentional.
Yes! Forgot to mention, thanks.
Oleg.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
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2009-05-03 18:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2009-05-04 19:09 ` Roland McGrath
2009-05-04 19:36 ` Oleg Nesterov
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