From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1757731AbZEFVbA (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 May 2009 17:31:00 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1755099AbZEFVau (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 May 2009 17:30:50 -0400 Received: from mx3.mail.elte.hu ([157.181.1.138]:56053 "EHLO mx3.mail.elte.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752248AbZEFVat (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 May 2009 17:30:49 -0400 Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 23:29:13 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar To: Markus Gutschke =?utf-8?B?KOmhp+Wtn+WLpCk=?= Cc: Linus Torvalds , Roland McGrath , Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole Message-ID: <20090506212913.GC4861@elte.hu> References: <20090228030226.C0D34FC3DA@magilla.sf.frob.com> <20090228030413.5B915FC3DA@magilla.sf.frob.com> <20090228072554.CFEA6FC3DA@magilla.sf.frob.com> <904b25810905061146ged374f2se0afd24e9e3c1f06@mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <904b25810905061146ged374f2se0afd24e9e3c1f06@mail.gmail.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.18 (2008-05-17) X-ELTE-VirusStatus: clean X-ELTE-SpamScore: -1.5 X-ELTE-SpamLevel: X-ELTE-SpamCheck: no X-ELTE-SpamVersion: ELTE 2.0 X-ELTE-SpamCheck-Details: score=-1.5 required=5.9 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no SpamAssassin version=3.2.3 -1.5 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayesian spam probability is 0 to 1% [score: 0.0000] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org * Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤) wrote: > On Sat, Feb 28, 2009 at 10:23, Linus Torvalds > wrote: > > And I guess the seccomp interaction means that this is > > potentially a 2.6.29 thing. Not that I know whether anybody > > actually _uses_ seccomp. It does seem to be enabled in at least > > Fedora kernels, but it might not be used anywhere. > > In the Linux version of Google Chrome, we are currently working on > code that will use seccomp for parts of our sandboxing solution. That's a pretty interesting usage. What would be fallback mode you are using if the kernel doesnt have seccomp built in? Completely non-sandboxed? Or a ptrace/PTRACE_SYSCALL based sandbox? Ingo