From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1762379AbZEFWUa (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 May 2009 18:20:30 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1761856AbZEFV4a (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 May 2009 17:56:30 -0400 Received: from mx2.mail.elte.hu ([157.181.151.9]:53254 "EHLO mx2.mail.elte.hu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1761944AbZEFV42 (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 May 2009 17:56:28 -0400 Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 23:54:50 +0200 From: Ingo Molnar To: Markus Gutschke =?utf-8?B?KOmhp+Wtn+WLpCk=?= Cc: Linus Torvalds , Roland McGrath , Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole Message-ID: <20090506215450.GA9537@elte.hu> References: <20090228030226.C0D34FC3DA@magilla.sf.frob.com> <20090228030413.5B915FC3DA@magilla.sf.frob.com> <20090228072554.CFEA6FC3DA@magilla.sf.frob.com> <904b25810905061146ged374f2se0afd24e9e3c1f06@mail.gmail.com> <20090506212913.GC4861@elte.hu> <904b25810905061446m73c42040nfff47c9b8950bcfa@mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <904b25810905061446m73c42040nfff47c9b8950bcfa@mail.gmail.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.18 (2008-05-17) X-ELTE-VirusStatus: clean X-ELTE-SpamScore: -1.5 X-ELTE-SpamLevel: X-ELTE-SpamCheck: no X-ELTE-SpamVersion: ELTE 2.0 X-ELTE-SpamCheck-Details: score=-1.5 required=5.9 tests=BAYES_00 autolearn=no SpamAssassin version=3.2.3 -1.5 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayesian spam probability is 0 to 1% [score: 0.0000] Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org * Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤) wrote: > On Wed, May 6, 2009 at 14:29, Ingo Molnar wrote: > > That's a pretty interesting usage. What would be fallback mode you > > are using if the kernel doesnt have seccomp built in? Completely > > non-sandboxed? Or a ptrace/PTRACE_SYSCALL based sandbox? > > Ptrace has performance and/or reliability problems when used to > sandbox threaded applications due to potential race conditions > when inspecting system call arguments. We hope that we can avoid > this problem with seccomp. It is very attractive that kernel > automatically terminates any application that violates the very > well-defined constraints of the sandbox. > > In general, we are currently exploring different options based on > general availability, functionality, and complexity of > implementation. Seccomp is a good middle ground that we expect to > be able to use in the medium term to provide an acceptable > solution for a large segment of Linux users. Although the > restriction to just four unfiltered system calls is painful. Which other system calls would you like to use? Futexes might be one, for fast synchronization primitives? Ingo