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From: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
To: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tom Zanussi <tzanussi@gmail.com>, Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, markus@google.com
Subject: Re: [RFC 1/1] seccomp: Add bitmask of allowed system calls.
Date: Fri, 8 May 2009 01:00:22 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090507230021.GC6472@nowhere> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <a84d7bc60905071534l1e65f216mfd9330e93e4da4e2@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, May 07, 2009 at 03:34:58PM -0700, Adam Langley wrote:
> > That assessment is incorrect, there's no difference between safety
> > here really.
> >
> > LSM cannot magically inspect user-space memory either when multiple
> > threads may access it. The point would be to define filters for
> > system call _arguments_, which are inherently thread-local and safe.
> 
> If I hook security_operations.socket_connect, I can validate the struct
> sockaddr after the final copy_from_user. However, since the sockaddr lives in
> userspace memory, if I try and validate it from ftrace SYSCALL_ENTER, I can't
> know that it won't change before sys_connect reads it again.
> 
> Because of that, there are system calls which an LSM hook can safely accept
> that an ftrace hook cannot. However, as you point out, any arguments passed in
> registers are inheriently safe and these may be sufficiently powerful.
> 
> > There are two problems with the bitmap scheme, which i also
> > suggested in a previous thread but then found it to be lacking:
> >
> > 1) enumeration: you define a bitmap. That will be problematic
> >   between compat and native 64-bit (both have different syscall
> >   vectors).
> 
> I /think/ it works out, but I've been bitten before with subtle 32/64 bit
> compat issues and accept that it's a bit ugly.
> 
> > 2) flexibility. It's an on/off selection per syscall. With the
> >   filter we have on, off, or filtered. That's a _whole_ lot more
> >   flexible.
> 
> Absolutely.
> 
> Is there a git tree that I can pull this parsing code from?
> (git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-2.6-trace.git
> maybe?). I can patch in the seccomp-on-ftrace work and try building the
> filtering on top of that. I'll see how it turns out anyway.


Hi,

The most uptodate one is:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip.git
on the tracing/filters topic.

See kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c

You might want to reuse some current syscall tracing facility.
An automated resolution table is built on bootime, you can look
at the end of arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c

This table links each syscalls nr to the matching attribute entry of syscall
in which you can find:

- parameters names
- parameters types
- syscall name

You can look at the hooks in include/linux/syscall.h:
The sections inside
#ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_SYSCALLS

Well, it's a bit insane to read, so you can also look
at include/trace/syscall.h and kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c and
see how it is used and how it could be reused.


Thanks,
Frederic.


  reply	other threads:[~2009-05-07 23:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-05-07 21:48 [RFC 1/1] seccomp: Add bitmask of allowed system calls Adam Langley
2009-05-07 22:14 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 22:34   ` Adam Langley
2009-05-07 23:00     ` Frederic Weisbecker [this message]
2009-05-08  5:32       ` Tom Zanussi
2009-05-08  9:19         ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-08 11:12         ` Frederic Weisbecker
2009-05-08  9:20       ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-08  2:37   ` James Morris
2009-05-08  9:44     ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-15 19:56 ` Pavel Machek
2009-05-15 20:29   ` Adam Langley

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