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From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	security@kernel.org, Linux@hera.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org,
	Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Arjan@hera.kernel.org, List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alan@hera.kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Jake Edge <jake@lwn.net>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>, de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [Security] [patch] random: make get_random_int() more random
Date: Sat, 16 May 2009 17:47:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090516154705.GA27139@1wt.eu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LFD.2.01.0905160811550.3301@localhost.localdomain>

On Sat, May 16, 2009 at 08:23:11AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> But at the same time, I personally suspect that it would be _much_ easier 
> to attack the hash if we actually gave out the whole 16 bytes (over 
> several iteration), when compared to what we do now (only give out a small 
> part and then re-hash). I can't back that up with any proofs, though, but 
> I suspect it's much harder to re-generate the hash if you never see more 
> than a very small part of the output.

if we use incremental values (such as modulus after a multiply), yes. But
SHA1 is not know yet to be easily reversible. I mean, it's not because you
can read the 160 bits of a hash which corresponds to a stupid counter that
you can guess the next 160 bits you will get. Of course the "stupid counter"
I'm speaking about must include some randomness itself so that it does not
end up with a small set of finite elements. But I'm not worried at all about
giving out all of the 160 bits of an SHA1 result.

Willy


  reply	other threads:[~2009-05-16 15:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-05-04 18:51 [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes Jake Edge
2009-05-04 19:00 ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2009-05-04 19:51   ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-05-04 20:20     ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-04 22:24       ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-04 23:26         ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-05-04 23:54         ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-05  7:51           ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-05 15:17             ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-05 15:35               ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-05 16:18                 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05 16:10               ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05  5:50         ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05  6:31           ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-05  8:14             ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-05 19:52               ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-05 20:22                 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05 21:20                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-06 10:33                     ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 10:30                   ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 16:25                     ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 16:48                       ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-06 17:57                         ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07  0:50                           ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 15:02                             ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 18:14                               ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 18:21                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 18:41                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-07 19:24                                   ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 15:16                           ` Florian Weimer
2009-05-07 16:55                             ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-07 17:53                               ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-07 18:42                                 ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 20:09                         ` [patch] random: make get_random_int() more random Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 20:41                           ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 20:51                             ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 21:10                               ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-06 21:24                                 ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-14 22:47                           ` Jake Edge
2009-05-14 22:55                             ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2009-05-15 13:47                               ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-15 15:10                                 ` Jake Edge
2009-05-16 10:00                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2009-05-16 10:39                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2009-05-16 12:02                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-05-16 14:00                                       ` Michael S. Zick
2009-05-16 14:28                                         ` Michael S. Zick
2009-05-16 14:57                                           ` Arjan van de Ven
2009-05-16 15:09                                             ` Michael S. Zick
2009-05-16 14:32                                       ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-16 13:58                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2009-05-16 15:23                                       ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-16 15:47                                         ` Willy Tarreau [this message]
2009-05-16 15:54                                         ` Oliver Neukum
2009-05-16 16:05                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-16 16:17                                             ` Linus Torvalds
2009-05-15  1:16                           ` Américo Wang
2009-05-06 20:25                       ` [Security] [PATCH] proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes Ingo Molnar
2009-05-06 20:52                         ` Matt Mackall
2009-05-05  8:58           ` Andi Kleen

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