[patch 60/87] keys: Handle there being no fallback destination keyring for request_key()

Greg KH
2009-06-09T10:31:47Z

[-- Attachment #1: keys-handle-there-being-no-fallback-destination-keyring-for-request_key.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2146 bytes --]

2.6.29-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

commit 34574dd10b6d0697b86703388d6d6af9cbf4bb48 upstream.

When request_key() is called, without there being any standard process
keyrings on which to fall back if a destination keyring is not specified, an
oops is liable to occur when construct_alloc_key() calls down_write() on
dest_keyring's semaphore.

Due to function inlining this may be seen as an oops in down_write() as called
from request_key_and_link().

This situation crops up during boot, where request_key() is called from within
the kernel (such as in CIFS mounts) where nobody is actually logged in, and so
PAM has not had a chance to create a session keyring and user keyrings to act
as the fallback.

To fix this, make construct_alloc_key() not attempt to cache a key if there is
no fallback key if no destination keyring is given specifically.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <cebbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
security/keys/request_key.c | 9 ++++++---
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct ke

set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);

- down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+ if (dest_keyring)
+ down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);

/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need
* to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we
@@ -322,10 +323,12 @@ static int construct_alloc_key(struct ke
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto key_already_present;

- __key_link(dest_keyring, key);
+ if (dest_keyring)
+ __key_link(dest_keyring, key);

mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
- up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+ if (dest_keyring)
+ up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
*_key = key;
kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));