From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com, scgtrp@gmail.com,
bugzilla-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org,
bugme-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org, xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [BUGFIX][PATCH 2/3] kcore: fix vread/vwrite to be aware of holes.
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2009 14:30:31 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090804143031.b9769a13.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090803201845.c3ae49b5.kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
On Mon, 3 Aug 2009 20:18:45 +0900
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> wrote:
> From: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
>
> vread/vwrite access vmalloc area without checking there is a page or not.
> In most case, this works well.
>
> In old ages, the caller of get_vm_ara() is only IOREMAP and there is no
> memory hole within vm_struct's [addr...addr + size - PAGE_SIZE]
> ( -PAGE_SIZE is for a guard page.)
>
> After per-cpu-alloc patch, it uses get_vm_area() for reserve continuous
> virtual address but remap _later_. There tend to be a hole in valid vmalloc
> area in vm_struct lists.
> Then, skip the hole (not mapped page) is necessary.
> This patch updates vread/vwrite() for avoiding memory hole.
>
> Routines which access vmalloc area without knowing for which addr is used
> are
> - /proc/kcore
> - /dev/kmem
>
> kcore checks IOREMAP, /dev/kmem doesn't. After this patch, IOREMAP is
> checked and /dev/kmem will avoid to read/write it.
> Fixes to /proc/kcore will be in the next patch in series.
>
> Changelog v2->v3:
> - fixed typos.
> - use kmap. (if not using kmap, we have to add lock here.)
> - fixed PAGE_MASK miss-use.
> Changelog v1->v2:
> - enhanced comments.
> - treat IOREMAP as hole always.
> - zero-fill memory hole if [addr...addr+size] includes valid pages.
> - returns 0 if [addr...addr+size) includes no valid pages.
>
> ...
>
> +static int aligned_vread(char *buf, char *addr, unsigned long count)
> +{
> + struct page *p;
> + int copied = 0;
> +
> + while (count) {
> + unsigned long offset, length;
> +
> + offset = (unsigned long)addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
> + length = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
> + if (length > count)
> + length = count;
> + p = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
> + /*
> + * To do safe access to this _mapped_ area, we need
> + * lock. But adding lock here means that we need to add
> + * overhead of vmalloc()/vfree() calles for this _debug_
> + * interface, rarely used. Instead of that, we'll use
> + * kmap() and get small overhead in this access function.
> + */
> + if (p) {
> + /* we can expect USR1 is not used */
It would be nice if the comment were to explain _why_ KM_USER1 is known
to be free here.
> + void *map = kmap_atomic(p, KM_USER1);
> + memcpy(buf, map + offset, length);
> + kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER1);
Can use clear_highpage().
> + } else
> + memset(buf, 0, length);
> +
> + addr += length;
> + buf += length;
> + copied += length;
> + count -= length;
> + }
> + return copied;
> +}
> +
> +static int aligned_vwrite(char *buf, char *addr, unsigned long count)
> +{
> + struct page *p;
> + int copied = 0;
> +
> + while (count) {
> + unsigned long offset, length;
> +
> + offset = (unsigned long)addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
> + length = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
> + if (length > count)
> + length = count;
> + p = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
> + /*
> + * To do safe access to this _mapped_ area, we need
> + * lock. But adding lock here means that we need to add
> + * overhead of vmalloc()/vfree() calles for this _debug_
> + * interface, rarely used. Instead of that, we'll use
> + * kmap() and get small overhead in this access function.
> + */
> + if (p) {
> + /* we can expect USR1 is not used */
> + void *map = kmap_atomic(p, KM_USER1);
> + memcpy(map + offset, buf, length);
> + kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER1);
clear_highpage().
> + }
> + addr += length;
> + buf += length;
> + copied += length;
> + count -= length;
> + }
> + return copied;
> +}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-08-04 21:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <bug-13850-10286@http.bugzilla.kernel.org/>
2009-07-28 23:05 ` [Bugme-new] [Bug 13850] New: reading /proc/kcore causes oops Andrew Morton
2009-07-28 23:48 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-29 2:46 ` Mike Smith
2009-07-29 3:32 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-29 8:36 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] vmalloc: reorder unmap and removal entry KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-29 8:48 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/2] vmalloc: vread vwrite avoid memory hole KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-29 9:59 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-07-29 11:51 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31 9:38 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-07-29 9:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] vmalloc: reorder unmap and removal entry Amerigo Wang
2009-07-29 11:53 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31 7:07 ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 0/3] fix bug for /proc/kcore causes panic (Was: [Bugme-new] [Bug 13850] New: reading /proc/kcore causes oops KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31 7:11 ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 1/3] fix vread/vwrite to be aware of memory hole KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31 9:57 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-07-31 10:32 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-03 9:10 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-03 9:10 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31 7:12 ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 2/3] kcore should use vread KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31 7:13 ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 3/3] unmap vmalloc area after hide it KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31 7:21 ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 0/3] fix bug for /proc/kcore causes panic (Was: [Bugme-new] [Bug 13850] New: reading /proc/kcore causes oops KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-03 11:14 ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 0/3] kcore: avoid access to holes in vmalloc v3 (Was " KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-03 11:15 ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 1/3] unmap vmalloc area after hide it KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-03 11:18 ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 2/3] kcore: fix vread/vwrite to be aware of holes KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-04 9:23 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-04 9:55 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-05 2:09 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-04 21:30 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2009-08-05 1:08 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-05 1:24 ` Andrew Morton
2009-08-05 1:39 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-03 11:19 ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 3/3] kcore: /proc/kcore should use vread KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
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