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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com, scgtrp@gmail.com,
	bugzilla-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org,
	bugme-daemon@bugzilla.kernel.org, xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [BUGFIX][PATCH 2/3] kcore: fix vread/vwrite to be aware of holes.
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2009 14:30:31 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090804143031.b9769a13.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090803201845.c3ae49b5.kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>

On Mon, 3 Aug 2009 20:18:45 +0900
KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> wrote:

> From: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
> 
> vread/vwrite access vmalloc area without checking there is a page or not.
> In most case, this works well.
> 
> In old ages, the caller of get_vm_ara() is only IOREMAP and there is no
> memory hole within vm_struct's [addr...addr + size - PAGE_SIZE]
> ( -PAGE_SIZE is for a guard page.)
> 
> After per-cpu-alloc patch, it uses get_vm_area() for reserve continuous
> virtual address but remap _later_. There tend to be a hole in valid vmalloc
> area in vm_struct lists.
> Then, skip the hole (not mapped page) is necessary.
> This patch updates vread/vwrite() for avoiding memory hole.
> 
> Routines which access vmalloc area without knowing for which addr is used
> are
>   - /proc/kcore
>   - /dev/kmem
> 
> kcore checks IOREMAP, /dev/kmem doesn't. After this patch, IOREMAP is
> checked and /dev/kmem will avoid to read/write it.
> Fixes to /proc/kcore will be in the next patch in series.
> 
> Changelog v2->v3:
>  - fixed typos.
>  - use kmap. (if not using kmap, we have to add lock here.)
>  - fixed PAGE_MASK miss-use.
> Changelog v1->v2:
>  - enhanced comments.
>  - treat IOREMAP as hole always.
>  - zero-fill memory hole if [addr...addr+size] includes valid pages.
>  - returns 0 if [addr...addr+size) includes no valid pages.
> 
> ...
>
> +static int aligned_vread(char *buf, char *addr, unsigned long count)
> +{
> +	struct page *p;
> +	int copied = 0;
> +
> +	while (count) {
> +		unsigned long offset, length;
> +
> +		offset = (unsigned long)addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
> +		length = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
> +		if (length > count)
> +			length = count;
> +		p = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
> +		/*
> +		 * To do safe access to this _mapped_ area, we need
> +		 * lock. But adding lock here means that we need to add
> +		 * overhead of vmalloc()/vfree() calles for this _debug_
> +		 * interface, rarely used. Instead of that, we'll use
> +		 * kmap() and get small overhead in this access function.
> +		 */
> +		if (p) {
> +			/* we can expect USR1 is not used */

It would be nice if the comment were to explain _why_ KM_USER1 is known
to be free here.


> +			void *map = kmap_atomic(p, KM_USER1);
> +			memcpy(buf, map + offset, length);
> +			kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER1);

Can use clear_highpage().

> +		} else
> +			memset(buf, 0, length);
> +
> +		addr += length;
> +		buf += length;
> +		copied += length;
> +		count -= length;
> +	}
> +	return copied;
> +}
> +
> +static int aligned_vwrite(char *buf, char *addr, unsigned long count)
> +{
> +	struct page *p;
> +	int copied = 0;
> +
> +	while (count) {
> +		unsigned long offset, length;
> +
> +		offset = (unsigned long)addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
> +		length = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
> +		if (length > count)
> +			length = count;
> +		p = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
> +		/*
> +		 * To do safe access to this _mapped_ area, we need
> +		 * lock. But adding lock here means that we need to add
> +		 * overhead of vmalloc()/vfree() calles for this _debug_
> +		 * interface, rarely used. Instead of that, we'll use
> +		 * kmap() and get small overhead in this access function.
> +		 */
> +		if (p) {
> +			/* we can expect USR1 is not used */
> +			void *map = kmap_atomic(p, KM_USER1);
> +			memcpy(map + offset, buf, length);
> +			kunmap_atomic(map, KM_USER1);

clear_highpage().

> +		}
> +		addr += length;
> +		buf += length;
> +		copied += length;
> +		count -= length;
> +	}
> +	return copied;
> +}


  parent reply	other threads:[~2009-08-04 21:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <bug-13850-10286@http.bugzilla.kernel.org/>
2009-07-28 23:05 ` [Bugme-new] [Bug 13850] New: reading /proc/kcore causes oops Andrew Morton
2009-07-28 23:48   ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-29  2:46     ` Mike Smith
2009-07-29  3:32       ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-29  8:36         ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] vmalloc: reorder unmap and removal entry KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-29  8:48           ` [RFC][PATCH 2/2] vmalloc: vread vwrite avoid memory hole KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-29  9:59             ` Amerigo Wang
2009-07-29 11:51               ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31  9:38                 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-07-29  9:40           ` [RFC][PATCH 1/2] vmalloc: reorder unmap and removal entry Amerigo Wang
2009-07-29 11:53             ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31  7:07         ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 0/3] fix bug for /proc/kcore causes panic (Was: [Bugme-new] [Bug 13850] New: reading /proc/kcore causes oops KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31  7:11           ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 1/3] fix vread/vwrite to be aware of memory hole KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31  9:57             ` Amerigo Wang
2009-07-31 10:32               ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-03  9:10                 ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-03  9:10                   ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31  7:12           ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 2/3] kcore should use vread KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31  7:13           ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 3/3] unmap vmalloc area after hide it KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-07-31  7:21           ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 0/3] fix bug for /proc/kcore causes panic (Was: [Bugme-new] [Bug 13850] New: reading /proc/kcore causes oops KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-03 11:14       ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 0/3] kcore: avoid access to holes in vmalloc v3 (Was " KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-03 11:15         ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 1/3] unmap vmalloc area after hide it KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-03 11:18         ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 2/3] kcore: fix vread/vwrite to be aware of holes KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-04  9:23           ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-04  9:55             ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-05  2:09               ` Amerigo Wang
2009-08-04 21:30           ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2009-08-05  1:08             ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-05  1:24               ` Andrew Morton
2009-08-05  1:39                 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-08-03 11:19         ` [BUGFIX][PATCH 3/3] kcore: /proc/kcore should use vread KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki

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