From: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
To: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>, Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>,
Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] HWPOISON: prevent /dev/kmem users from accessing hwpoison pages
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 10:18:54 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090915022328.587059822@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20090915021851.168285585@intel.com
[-- Attachment #1: kmem-dev-kmem.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 5557 bytes --]
When /dev/kmem read()/write() encounters hwpoison page, stop it
and return the amount of work done till now.
CC: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
CC: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
CC: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
---
drivers/char/mem.c | 18 +++++++++++----
mm/vmalloc.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
--- linux-mm.orig/drivers/char/mem.c 2009-09-15 10:14:20.000000000 +0800
+++ linux-mm/drivers/char/mem.c 2009-09-15 10:14:25.000000000 +0800
@@ -429,6 +429,9 @@ static ssize_t read_kmem(struct file *fi
*/
kbuf = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((char *)p);
+ if (unlikely(virt_addr_valid(kbuf) &&
+ PageHWPoison(virt_to_page(kbuf))))
+ return -EIO;
if (copy_to_user(buf, kbuf, sz))
return -EFAULT;
buf += sz;
@@ -474,6 +477,7 @@ do_write_kmem(unsigned long p, const cha
{
ssize_t written, sz;
unsigned long copied;
+ int err = 0;
written = 0;
#ifdef __ARCH_HAS_NO_PAGE_ZERO_MAPPED
@@ -500,13 +504,19 @@ do_write_kmem(unsigned long p, const cha
*/
ptr = xlate_dev_kmem_ptr((char *)p);
+ if (unlikely(virt_addr_valid(ptr) &&
+ PageHWPoison(virt_to_page(ptr)))) {
+ err = -EIO;
+ break;
+ }
+
copied = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, sz);
if (copied) {
written += sz - copied;
- if (written)
- break;
- return -EFAULT;
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ break;
}
+
buf += sz;
p += sz;
count -= sz;
@@ -514,7 +524,7 @@ do_write_kmem(unsigned long p, const cha
}
*ppos += written;
- return written;
+ return written ? written : err;
}
--- linux-mm.orig/mm/vmalloc.c 2009-09-15 10:14:18.000000000 +0800
+++ linux-mm/mm/vmalloc.c 2009-09-15 10:17:20.000000000 +0800
@@ -1661,6 +1661,8 @@ static int aligned_vread(char *buf, char
if (length > count)
length = count;
p = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
+ if (unlikely(p && PageHWPoison(p)))
+ break;
/*
* To do safe access to this _mapped_ area, we need
* lock. But adding lock here means that we need to add
@@ -1700,6 +1702,8 @@ static int aligned_vwrite(char *buf, cha
if (length > count)
length = count;
p = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
+ if (unlikely(p && PageHWPoison(p)))
+ break;
/*
* To do safe access to this _mapped_ area, we need
* lock. But adding lock here means that we need to add
@@ -1731,8 +1735,10 @@ static int aligned_vwrite(char *buf, cha
* @count: number of bytes to be read.
*
* Returns # of bytes which addr and buf should be increased.
- * (same number to @count). Returns 0 if [addr...addr+count) doesn't
- * includes any intersect with alive vmalloc area.
+ * (same number to @count if no hwpoison pages encountered).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if [addr...addr+count) doesn't includes any intersect with
+ * alive vmalloc area.
*
* This function checks that addr is a valid vmalloc'ed area, and
* copy data from that area to a given buffer. If the given memory range
@@ -1740,8 +1746,6 @@ static int aligned_vwrite(char *buf, cha
* proper area of @buf. If there are memory holes, they'll be zero-filled.
* IOREMAP area is treated as memory hole and no copy is done.
*
- * If [addr...addr+count) doesn't includes any intersects with alive
- * vm_struct area, returns 0.
* @buf should be kernel's buffer. Because this function uses KM_USER0,
* the caller should guarantee KM_USER0 is not used.
*
@@ -1757,7 +1761,8 @@ long vread(char *buf, char *addr, unsign
struct vm_struct *tmp;
char *vaddr, *buf_start = buf;
unsigned long buflen = count;
- unsigned long n;
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ unsigned long n = 0;
/* Don't allow overflow */
if ((unsigned long) addr + count < count)
@@ -1780,12 +1785,16 @@ long vread(char *buf, char *addr, unsign
if (n > count)
n = count;
if (!(tmp->flags & VM_IOREMAP))
- aligned_vread(buf, addr, n);
- else /* IOREMAP area is treated as memory hole */
+ ret = aligned_vread(buf, addr, n);
+ else { /* IOREMAP area is treated as memory hole */
memset(buf, 0, n);
- buf += n;
- addr += n;
- count -= n;
+ ret = n;
+ }
+ buf += ret;
+ addr += ret;
+ count -= ret;
+ if (ret < n)
+ break;
}
finished:
read_unlock(&vmlist_lock);
@@ -1796,7 +1805,7 @@ finished:
if (buf != buf_start + buflen)
memset(buf, 0, buflen - (buf - buf_start));
- return buflen;
+ return ret == n ? buflen : buflen - count;
}
/**
@@ -1806,7 +1815,7 @@ finished:
* @count: number of bytes to be read.
*
* Returns # of bytes which addr and buf should be increased.
- * (same number to @count).
+ * (same number to @count if no hwpoison pages encountered).
*
* This function checks that addr is a valid vmalloc'ed area, and
* copy data from a buffer to the given addr. If specified range of
@@ -1829,7 +1838,9 @@ long vwrite(char *buf, char *addr, unsig
{
struct vm_struct *tmp;
char *vaddr;
- unsigned long n, buflen;
+ unsigned long buflen;
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+ unsigned long n = 0;
/* Don't allow overflow */
if ((unsigned long) addr + count < count)
@@ -1852,14 +1863,18 @@ long vwrite(char *buf, char *addr, unsig
if (n > count)
n = count;
if (!(tmp->flags & VM_IOREMAP))
- aligned_vwrite(buf, addr, n);
- buf += n;
- addr += n;
- count -= n;
+ ret = aligned_vwrite(buf, addr, n);
+ else
+ ret = n;
+ buf += ret;
+ addr += ret;
+ count -= ret;
+ if (ret < n)
+ break;
}
finished:
read_unlock(&vmlist_lock);
- return buflen;
+ return ret == n ? buflen : buflen - count;
}
/**
--
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-09-15 2:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-09-15 2:18 [PATCH 0/3] /proc/kmem cleanups and hwpoison bits Wu Fengguang
2009-09-15 2:18 ` [PATCH 1/3] vmalloc: ignore vmalloc area holes in vwrite() Wu Fengguang
2009-09-15 2:34 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-09-15 3:15 ` Wu Fengguang
2009-09-15 3:18 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-09-15 5:21 ` Wu Fengguang
2009-09-15 2:18 ` [PATCH 2/3] devmem: handle partial kmem write/read Wu Fengguang
2009-09-15 2:38 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-09-15 9:01 ` Wu Fengguang
2009-09-15 9:03 ` Wu Fengguang
2009-09-15 2:18 ` Wu Fengguang [this message]
2009-09-15 2:45 ` [PATCH 3/3] HWPOISON: prevent /dev/kmem users from accessing hwpoison pages KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-09-15 3:09 ` [PATCH 0/3] /proc/kmem cleanups and hwpoison bits KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-09-15 8:22 ` Wu Fengguang
2009-09-15 10:16 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-09-16 0:39 ` KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki
2009-09-16 0:39 ` Wu Fengguang
2009-09-16 9:01 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2009-09-16 11:26 ` Hugh Dickins
2009-09-16 11:42 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2009-09-16 1:39 [PATCH 0/3] /proc/kmem fixes and hwpoison bits v2 Wu Fengguang
2009-09-16 1:39 ` [PATCH 3/3] HWPOISON: prevent /dev/kmem users from accessing hwpoison pages Wu Fengguang
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