From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
sds@tycho.nsa.gov, jmorris@namei.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sysfs: Don't leak secdata when a sysfs_dirent is freed.
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2009 08:09:13 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20091104140913.GA4355@us.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <m1zl7236ox.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org>
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
>
> While refreshing my sysfs patches I noticed a leak in the secdata
> implementation. We don't free the secdata when we free the
> sysfs dirent.
>
> This is a bug in 2.6.32-rc5 that we really should close.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@aristanetworks.com>
I'm surprised no kmemleak or anything has found this - but I guess
not many sites hand-set custom selinux contexts on sysfs?
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
> ---
>
> fs/sysfs/dir.c | 4 ++++
> 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/sysfs/dir.c b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
> index 5fad489..e020183 100644
> --- a/fs/sysfs/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/sysfs/dir.c
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
> #include <linux/completion.h>
> #include <linux/mutex.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include "sysfs.h"
>
> DEFINE_MUTEX(sysfs_mutex);
> @@ -285,6 +286,9 @@ void release_sysfs_dirent(struct sysfs_dirent * sd)
> sysfs_put(sd->s_symlink.target_sd);
> if (sysfs_type(sd) & SYSFS_COPY_NAME)
> kfree(sd->s_name);
> + if (sd->s_iattr && sd->s_iattr->ia_secdata)
> + security_release_secctx(sd->s_iattr->ia_secdata,
> + sd->s_iattr->ia_secdata_len);
> kfree(sd->s_iattr);
> sysfs_free_ino(sd->s_ino);
> kmem_cache_free(sysfs_dir_cachep, sd);
> --
> 1.6.5.2.143.g8cc62
>
> --
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> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-11-04 14:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-11-04 10:50 [PATCH] sysfs: Don't leak secdata when a sysfs_dirent is freed Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-04 14:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2009-11-04 14:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-04 21:40 ` [GIT] " James Morris
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2009-11-03 11:02 [PATCH 01/42] " Eric W. Biederman
2009-11-04 10:36 ` [PATCH] " Eric W. Biederman
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