A basic question about the security_* hooks

[Michael Stone <michael@laptop.org>]

Dear kernel folks,

There are a variety of places where I'd like to be able to get the kernel to
return EPERM more often [1]. Many of these places already have security hooks.

Unfortunately, I don't feel that I can make effective use of these hooks
because they seem to be "occupied" by the large mandatory access control
frameworks.

I'm hoping that you can tell me why this state of affairs persists.

More specifically, now that LSMs are statically linked, why is it good for the
security hooks to call into a single monolithic "security_ops" struct instead
of cheaper and simpler alternatives?

In particular, what would be worse about a kernel in which each security hook
contained nothing but conditionally-compiled function calls to the appropriate
"real" implementation functions with early-exit jumps on non-zero return codes?

Thanks,

Michael

[1]: Two examples include my recent network-privileges patches and Eric
Biederman's suggestions on how to make unprivileged unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) safe.
I have little doubt that I'd think of more if I thought that the security hooks
were accessible to me.