Re:

Hillf Danton
2014-10-17T05:49:16Z

Hey Kees

> From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
> Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>, Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>, Rob
> Herring <robh@kernel.org>, Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>, Mark
> Salter <msalter@redhat.com>, Liu hua <
> Subject: [PATCH v6 8/8] ARM: mm: allow text and rodata sections to be
> read-only
> Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 12:19:09 -0700
> Message-Id: <1411067949-10913-9-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
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>
> This introduces CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, making kernel text and rodata
> read-only. Additionally, this splits rodata from text so that rodata can
> also be NX, which may lead to wasted memory when aligning to SECTION_SIZE.
> The read-only areas are made writable during ftrace updates and kexec.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Tested-by: Laura Abbott <lauraa@codeaurora.org>
> Acked-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
> ---
> arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 10 ++++++++
> arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++
> arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 1 +
> arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 3 +++
> arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++
> arch/arm/mm/init.c | 48
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 6 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> index 79ecb4f34ffb..9108292edcb5 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h
> @@ -486,6 +486,16 @@ int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
> int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
> int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +void mark_rodata_ro(void);
> +void set_kernel_text_rw(void);
> +void set_kernel_text_ro(void);
> +#else
> +static inline void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { }
> +static inline void set_kernel_text_ro(void) { }
> +#endif
> +
> void flush_uprobe_xol_access(struct page *page, unsigned long uaddr,
> void *kaddr, unsigned long len);
> +
> #endif
> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
> index af9a8a927a4e..b8c75e45a950 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
> #include <linux/ftrace.h>
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
>
> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
> #include <asm/opcodes.h>
> @@ -35,6 +36,22 @@
>
> #define OLD_NOP 0xe1a00000 /* mov r0, r0 */
>
> +static int __ftrace_modify_code(void *data)
> +{
> + int *command = data;
> +
> + set_kernel_text_rw();
> + ftrace_modify_all_code(*command);
> + set_kernel_text_ro();
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +void arch_ftrace_update_code(int command)
> +{
> + stop_machine(__ftrace_modify_code, &command, NULL);
> +}
> +
> static unsigned long ftrace_nop_replace(struct dyn_ftrace *rec)
> {
> return rec->arch.old_mcount ? OLD_NOP : NOP;
> @@ -73,6 +90,8 @@ int ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare(void)
> int ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process(void)
> {
> set_all_modules_text_ro();
> + /* Make sure any TLB misses during machine stop are cleared. */
> + flush_tlb_all();
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
> b/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
> index 8f75250cbe30..4423a565ef6f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/machine_kexec.c
> @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
> reboot_code_buffer = page_address(image->control_code_page);
>
> /* Prepare parameters for reboot_code_buffer*/
> + set_kernel_text_rw();
> kexec_start_address = image->start;
> kexec_indirection_page = page_list;
> kexec_mach_type = machine_arch_type;
> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> index a3d07ca2bbb4..542e58919bd9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> @@ -120,6 +120,9 @@ SECTIONS
> ARM_CPU_KEEP(PROC_INFO)
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> + . = ALIGN(1<<SECTION_SHIFT);
> +#endif
> RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
>
> . = ALIGN(4);
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
> index 7a0756df91a2..c9cd9c5bf1e1 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
> @@ -1017,3 +1017,15 @@ config ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS
> padded to section-size (1MiB) boundaries (because their permissions
> are different and splitting the 1M pages into 4K ones causes TLB
> performance problems), wasting memory.
> +
> +config DEBUG_RODATA
> + bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only"
> + depends on ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS
> + default y
> + help
> + If this is set, kernel text and rodata will be made read-only. This
> + is to help catch accidental or malicious attempts to change the
> + kernel's executable code. Additionally splits rodata from kernel
> + text so it can be made explicitly non-executable. This creates
> + another section-size padded region, so it can waste more memory
> + space while gaining the read-only protections.
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/init.c b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
> index e6bfe76b2f59..dc2db779cdf4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/init.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/init.c
> @@ -622,9 +622,10 @@ struct section_perm {
> unsigned long end;
> pmdval_t mask;
> pmdval_t prot;
> + pmdval_t clear;
> };
>
> -struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
> +static struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
> /* Make pages tables, etc before _stext RW (set NX). */
> {
> .start = PAGE_OFFSET,
> @@ -639,8 +640,35 @@ struct section_perm nx_perms[] = {
> .mask = ~PMD_SECT_XN,
> .prot = PMD_SECT_XN,
> },
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> + /* Make rodata NX (set RO in ro_perms below). */
> + {
> + .start = (unsigned long)__start_rodata,
> + .end = (unsigned long)__init_begin,
> + .mask = ~PMD_SECT_XN,
> + .prot = PMD_SECT_XN,
> + },
> +#endif
> };
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +static struct section_perm ro_perms[] = {
> + /* Make kernel code and rodata RX (set RO). */
> + {
> + .start = (unsigned long)_stext,
> + .end = (unsigned long)__init_begin,
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
> + .mask = ~PMD_SECT_RDONLY,
> + .prot = PMD_SECT_RDONLY,
> +#else
> + .mask = ~(PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE),
> + .prot = PMD_SECT_APX | PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
> + .clear = PMD_SECT_AP_WRITE,
> +#endif
> + },
> +};
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Updates section permissions only for the current mm (sections are
> * copied into each mm). During startup, this is the init_mm. Is only
> @@ -704,6 +732,24 @@ static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void)
> {
> set_section_perms(nx_perms, prot);
> }
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA
> +void mark_rodata_ro(void)
> +{
> + set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
> +}
> +
> +void set_kernel_text_rw(void)
> +{
> + set_section_perms(ro_perms, clear);
> +}
> +
> +void set_kernel_text_ro(void)
> +{
> + set_section_perms(ro_perms, prot);
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA */
> +
> #else
> static inline void fix_kernmem_perms(void) { }
> #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_KERNMEM_PERMS */
> --
> 1.9.1
>
> --
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