From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Ashwin Ganti <ashwin.ganti@gmail.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
rsc@swtch.com, ericvh@gmail.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Ron Minnich <rminnich@gmail.com>,
jt.beard@gmail.com, Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Kyle Moffett <kyle@moffetthome.net>,
Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] p9auth: add CAP_GRANT_ID to authorize use of /dev/caphash
Date: Tue, 27 Apr 2010 11:43:36 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20100427164336.GB7530@us.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20100427164139.GA7359@us.ibm.com>
Granting userid capabilities to another task is a dangerous
privilege. Don't just let file permissions authorize it.
Define CAP_GRANT_ID as a new capability needed to write to
/dev/caphash.
For one thing this lets us start a factotum server early on
in init, then have init drop CAP_GRANT_ID from its bounding
set so the rest of the system cannot regain it.
(This patch is only useful if the next patch, introducing p9auth fs, is
upstreamed)
TODO - patch for capabilities.7 manpage
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 39e5ff5..ba2cbfe 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -355,7 +355,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
#define CAP_MAC_ADMIN 33
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+/* Allow granting setuid capabilities through p9auth /dev/caphash */
+
+#define CAP_GRANT_ID 34
+
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_GRANT_ID
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 8b32e95..f0ec53a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
"node_bind", "name_connect", NULL } },
{ "memprotect", { "mmap_zero", NULL } },
{ "peer", { "recv", NULL } },
- { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", NULL } },
+ { "capability2", { "mac_override", "mac_admin", "grant_id", NULL } },
{ "kernel_service", { "use_as_override", "create_files_as", NULL } },
{ "tun_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
--
1.7.0.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-04-27 20:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-04-27 16:41 [PATCH 0/3] p9auth fs: introduction Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-27 16:42 ` [PATCH 1/3] p9auth: split core function out of some set*{u,g}id functions Serge E. Hallyn
2010-05-04 14:52 ` David Howells
2010-04-27 16:43 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2010-04-27 16:45 ` [PATCH 3/3] RFC: p9auth: add p9auth fs Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-28 11:17 ` Oleg Nesterov
2010-04-28 15:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-28 15:39 ` Oleg Nesterov
2010-05-03 23:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-05-04 14:57 ` David Howells
2010-05-04 15:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2010-04-21 1:27 [PATCH 1/3] p9auth: split core function out of some set*{u,g}id functions Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-21 1:28 ` [PATCH 2/3] p9auth: add CAP_GRANT_ID to authorize use of /dev/caphash Serge E. Hallyn
2010-04-21 2:54 ` Greg KH
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