public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
To: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
	Dave Young <hidave.darkstar@gmail.com>,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	sds@tycho.nsa.gov, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] fs: block cross-uid sticky symlinks
Date: Sun, 30 May 2010 21:23:37 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20100531042336.GS6056@outflux.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1275278063.20730.16.camel@localhost>

Hi Eric,

On Sun, May 30, 2010 at 11:54:23PM -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> We need to call this function in the SELinux case.  So you'll need a
> patch like the one attached (not even compiled but I think it is right)
> [..]
>  static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
> [..]
> +       rc = cap_inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);

Yeah, when I quickly checked SELinux and AppArmor, it seemed that they
were always calling down to all commoncaps functions, but it looks like
not in all cases.  I think that Eric Biederman's observations here makes
the most sense: this check needs to happen without involving the LSMs
at all.

> > +int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
> > +			  struct nameidata *nameidata)
> > +{
> > +	const struct inode *parent = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
> > +	const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> > +	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > +
> > +	if (weak_sticky_symlinks)
> > +		return 0;
> > +
> > +	if ((parent->i_mode & (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH)) == (S_ISVTX|S_IWOTH) &&
> > +	    parent->i_uid != inode->i_uid &&
> > +	    cred->fsuid != inode->i_uid) {
> > +		printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "non-matching-uid symlink "
> > +			"following attempted in sticky-directory by "
> > +			"%s (fsuid %d)\n", current->comm, cred->fsuid);
> > +		return -EACCES;
> > +	}
> > +	return 0;
> > +}
> 
> What stops us from racing between the assignment of parent and it's
> first use with a rename on our object and rmdir on the old parent?  I'm
> wondering if we need to be doing this test holding dentry->d_lock (which
> is what protects dentry->d_parent if I recall correctly)
> 
> Certainly doesn't fix all of the raciness, but I think it would close
> the opps part.  Maybe someone who knows the VFS better can tell me if I
> am misguided.

The only other use of d_parent I can see there is in may_delete().  With
vfs_unlink() calling that, it would seem to be racey too if we needed to
hold a lock for that.  But it's not clear to me in vfs_follow_link is doing
locking somehow.

Thanks,

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team

  reply	other threads:[~2010-05-31  4:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-05-31  3:04 [PATCH v2] fs: block cross-uid sticky symlinks Kees Cook
2010-05-31  3:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-05-31  4:12   ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31  3:54 ` Eric Paris
2010-05-31  4:23   ` Kees Cook [this message]
2010-05-31 10:23 ` Alan Cox
2010-05-31 17:50   ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 18:09     ` Alan Cox
2010-05-31 19:07       ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 19:52         ` Al Viro
2010-05-31 22:00           ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 19:27     ` Al Viro
2010-05-31 10:35 ` Christoph Hellwig
2010-05-31 17:57   ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 23:09     ` James Morris
2010-06-01  3:24       ` Kees Cook
2010-06-01  7:55         ` Christoph Hellwig
2010-06-01 11:55           ` Eric Paris
2010-06-01 14:52             ` Kees Cook
2010-06-01 15:34               ` Eric Paris
2010-06-01 17:31                 ` tytso
2010-06-01 15:00           ` Kees Cook
2010-05-31 10:47 ` tytso

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20100531042336.GS6056@outflux.net \
    --to=kees.cook@canonical.com \
    --cc=a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=eparis@redhat.com \
    --cc=hidave.darkstar@gmail.com \
    --cc=jkosina@suse.cz \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@elte.hu \
    --cc=rdunlap@xenotime.net \
    --cc=schwidefsky@de.ibm.com \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=serue@us.ibm.com \
    --cc=tim.gardner@canonical.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox