From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
To: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, adobriyan@gmail.com,
nhorman@tuxdriver.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
jirislaby@gmail.com, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 06/11] rlimits: do security check under task_lock
Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2010 20:08:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20100607180855.GA6689@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1275855783-27316-1-git-send-email-jslaby@suse.cz>
(add selinux maintainers)
First of all, my apologies for the huge delay. And I still didn't
read the whole series, sorry.
On 06/06, Jiri Slaby wrote:
>
> +static int check_security_task_setrlimit_unlocked(struct task_struct *tsk,
> + unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim,
> + struct rlimit *old_rlim)
> +{
> + struct rlimit rlim;
> + int ret;
> +
> + memcpy(&rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(rlim));
> +
> + task_unlock(tsk->group_leader);
> + ret = security_task_setrlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim);
> + task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
> +
> + if (!ret && memcmp(&rlim, old_rlim, sizeof(rlim)))
> + return -EAGAIN;
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> /* make sure you are allowed to change @tsk limits before calling this */
> int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
> struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim)
> {
> struct rlimit *rlim;
> - int retval = 0;
> + int retval;
>
> if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
> return -EINVAL;
> @@ -1339,13 +1364,19 @@ int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
>
> rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;
> task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
> +again:
> + retval = 0;
> if (new_rlim) {
> if ((new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max) &&
> !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
> retval = -EPERM;
> - if (!retval)
> - retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk, resource,
> - new_rlim);
> + if (!retval) {
> + retval = check_security_task_setrlimit_unlocked(tsk,
> + resource, new_rlim, rlim);
> + if (retval == -EAGAIN) {
> + goto again;
> + }
> + }
Oh. Can't we just ignore this (imho minor) race ? Or just verify/document that
current_has_perm() can be called under task_lock. Actually, I do not think
we have a race, selinux_task_setrlimit() only checks that the caller has
rights to change the rlimits.
And. Given that avc_has_perm() can be called from irq context (say,
selinux_file_send_sigiotask or selinux_task_kill), we can assume it is safe
to call it under task_lock() which is not irq-safe.
But. OTOH, if we are really worried about security_ ops, then we have another
reason to call this hook under task_lock(), and we probably want to modify
selinux_bprm_committing_creds() to take this lock too:
--- security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2333,11 +2333,14 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_cred
rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
if (rc) {
+ /* protects against do_prlimit() */
+ task_lock(current);
for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
}
+ task_unlock(current);
update_rlimit_cpu(current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur);
}
}
Finally. selinux_task_setrlimit(p) uses __task_cred(p) for the check.
This looks a bit strange, different threads can have different creds
but obviously rlimits are per-process.
Perhaps it makes sense to do selinux_task_setrlimit(p->group_leader)?
At least in this case the result should be "consistent".
Oleg.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-06-07 18:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-05-10 18:00 [PATCH v3 01/11] rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit Jiri Slaby
2010-05-10 18:00 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu Jiri Slaby
2010-05-10 18:00 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit Jiri Slaby
2010-05-10 18:00 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] rlimits: split sys_setrlimit Jiri Slaby
2010-05-10 18:00 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks Jiri Slaby
2010-05-13 22:56 ` Andrew Morton
2010-06-06 20:23 ` [PATCH v3 06/11] rlimits: do security check under task_lock Jiri Slaby
2010-06-07 18:08 ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2010-06-23 15:20 ` Jiri Slaby
2010-06-23 16:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
2010-06-23 17:44 ` Jiri Slaby
2010-06-23 17:56 ` Oleg Nesterov
2010-06-23 21:35 ` Jiri Slaby
2010-06-23 18:37 ` Stephen Smalley
2010-05-10 18:00 ` Jiri Slaby
2010-05-13 22:56 ` Andrew Morton
2010-05-10 18:00 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] rlimits: add rlimit64 structure Jiri Slaby
2010-05-10 18:00 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit Jiri Slaby
2010-05-10 18:00 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit Jiri Slaby
2010-05-10 18:00 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall Jiri Slaby
2010-05-13 22:56 ` Andrew Morton
2010-05-26 12:58 ` Jiri Slaby
2010-05-26 14:30 ` Andrew Morton
2010-05-26 15:13 ` Jiri Slaby
2010-05-10 18:00 ` [PATCH v3 11/11] unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers Jiri Slaby
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