Re: [RFC 02/22] configfs: Add struct configfs_item_operations->check_link() in configfs_unlink()

Nicholas A. Bellinger
2010-09-08T02:13:01Z

On Tue, 2010-09-07 at 15:44 -0700, Joel Becker wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 07, 2010 at 05:01:01PM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > > > I NAK'd this a while back. I'm willing to be convinced, but so
> > > > far it remains that way.
> > >
> > > Hi Joel,
> > >
> > > Thanks for bringing this point up again. So a brief refresh on why this
> > > is currently required in the fabric independent configfs handlers in
> > > drivers/target/target_core_fabric_configfs.c (patch #19).
> >
> > Well, that is great that you mentioned your requirements. But I don't see a
> > quote of Joel's concerns? Is there an LKML link for it perhaps?
>
> It was a while back. Essentially, the concern is that configfs
> is defined to be userspace-driven. If the user asks you to remove
> something, the module should be handling safe teardown rather than
> rejecting the user's request.
> Now, the world isn't always clean-cut. Code outside of the
> filesystem representation can lay a claim on a configfs item to say "I'm
> busy with this." An example is ocfs2 pinning the configfs item
> describing its cluster heartbeat device. But this is ocfs2 - a
> separate thing - claiming it. There is a defined API to take and
> release these claims.
> This API doesn't cover symlinks, as symlinks are simply linkage
> between config items. It may be, as Nick suggested at the bottom of his
> reply, that we want the API extended to cover that case. But he hasn't
> yet convinced me that safe teardown is impossible or disasterous.
> That's what I'd like to see. It's not obvious on the face of all the
> file trees in the email.
> Nick, can you provide some form of description, not long
> pathnames, that explains a) what breaks when the symlink is removed b)
> why that can't be allowed if the user is dumb enough to request it?
>

Hi Joel,

So, the case where configfs will actually OOPs without the
->check_link() patch (or without some other internal solution) is on the
unlink(2) path is when the symlink is created to a destination outside
of the source struct config_group. This may have not been exactly
apparent in my LIO-Target example, but here is another shot at an
example without the other complexities of target mode invovled.

Say we have two different struct config_subsystem in two different LKM
sub_parent and sub_child. I will spare the actual mkdir(2) and ln(2)
calls here, but (I hope) these are obvious:

First, we start out with the parent source struct config_group from
sub_parent module:

/sys/kernel/config/sub_parent/group1/parent/

Next, we have a symlink from sub_parent/group1/parent to a different LKM
in sub_child:

/sys/kernel/config/sub_child/group1/src_0/src_link -> ../../../../sub_parent/group1/parent

And then a second symlink from sub_child/group1/src_0/src_link to a
sstuct config_group outside of group1, but still within sub_child:

/sys/kernel/config/sub_child/group2/dst_0/dst_link -> ../../../group1/src_0/

So once the sub_child/group2/dest_0/dst_link has been created to back to
sub_child/group1/src_0/src_link, the oops will appear any time that
'unlink sub_child/group1/src_0/src_link' is called while the second
group2/dst_0/dst_link is still present. I don't recall the actual
backtrace of the OOPs that occurs when the unlink(2) is called, but it
is easily reproducable .

I am really starting to think that fixing this properly below the struct
config_item_operations API is going to make the most sense, but I have
not realized this in a patch for fs/configfs/ just yet.. I am happy to
do this in the next days if you think this would be the cleanest
resolution for the above case.

Thanks Joel!

--nab