From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Ozan Çağlayan" <ozan@pardus.org.tr>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"David Safford" <safford@watson.ibm.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h
Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2010 13:57:37 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201011031357.37976.sgrubb@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1288805913.2939.53.camel@localhost.localdomain>
On Wednesday, November 03, 2010 01:38:33 pm Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > > As long as we're making this change, should 'security' also be defined
> > > outside of the __kernel__ definitions?
> >
> > I guess no one fixed this before 2.6.36 was finalized. Removing the
> > define has broke user space compilation for anything that works on file
> > based capabilities. I can define it myself, but if the kernel folks ever
> > change the string, then we have more than just a compile problem, we
> > have runtime problems because I can no longer use the correct string.
> >
> > So, what was the gain for breaking user space?
> >
> > -Steve
>
> Sorry I dropped the ball. Was expecting some kind of response to my
> question above, and then forgot about it.
>
> All of the 'security' xattrs were moved to fsmagic.h, including
> capability. Not only those that EVM protects, but others like
> XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN/OUT (based on Casey's request).
If user space has to know the exact contents of a string in order to do something that
the kernel understands, then its part of a public API. I've made my own define and
released a new copy of libcap-ng. So, if the contents of the string ever change, or
becomes deprecated, you'll now have user space apps using the old values no matter
what.
-Steve
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-11-03 17:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-07-01 19:07 [PATCH] security: move LSM xattrnames to xattr.h Mimi Zohar
2010-07-02 0:16 ` James Morris
2010-10-12 11:14 ` Ozan Çağlayan
2010-10-12 13:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-10-12 13:19 ` Steve Grubb
2010-10-12 13:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-11-03 17:00 ` Steve Grubb
2010-11-03 17:38 ` Mimi Zohar
2010-11-03 17:57 ` Steve Grubb [this message]
2010-11-03 19:02 ` Eric Paris
2010-11-03 19:46 ` Steve Grubb
2010-11-03 20:26 ` Eric Paris
2010-11-03 20:45 ` Mimi Zohar
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