From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932894Ab0LHBEG (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Dec 2010 20:04:06 -0500 Received: from kroah.org ([198.145.64.141]:33842 "EHLO coco.kroah.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932856Ab0LHBDz (ORCPT ); Tue, 7 Dec 2010 20:03:55 -0500 X-Mailbox-Line: From gregkh@clark.site Tue Dec 7 16:57:47 2010 Message-Id: <20101208005747.731207874@clark.site> User-Agent: quilt/0.48-11.2 Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2010 17:00:40 -0800 From: Greg KH To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org Cc: stable-review@kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, "David S. Miller" Subject: [263/289] net: Limit socket I/O iovec total length to INT_MAX. In-Reply-To: <20101208005821.GA2922@kroah.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 2.6.36-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know. ------------------ From: David S. Miller commit 8acfe468b0384e834a303f08ebc4953d72fb690a upstream. This helps protect us from overflow issues down in the individual protocol sendmsg/recvmsg handlers. Once we hit INT_MAX we truncate out the rest of the iovec by setting the iov_len members to zero. This works because: 1) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets, partial writes are allowed and the application will just continue with another write to send the rest of the data. 2) For datagram oriented sockets, where there must be a one-to-one correspondance between write() calls and packets on the wire, INT_MAX is going to be far larger than the packet size limit the protocol is going to check for and signal with -EMSGSIZE. Based upon a patch by Linus Torvalds. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/socket.h | 2 +- net/compat.c | 10 ++++++---- net/core/iovec.c | 20 +++++++++----------- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/socket.h +++ b/include/linux/socket.h @@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ extern int csum_partial_copy_fromiovecen int offset, unsigned int len, __wsum *csump); -extern long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode); +extern int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode); extern int memcpy_toiovec(struct iovec *v, unsigned char *kdata, int len); extern int memcpy_toiovecend(const struct iovec *v, unsigned char *kdata, int offset, int len); --- a/net/compat.c +++ b/net/compat.c @@ -41,10 +41,12 @@ static inline int iov_from_user_compat_t compat_size_t len; if (get_user(len, &uiov32->iov_len) || - get_user(buf, &uiov32->iov_base)) { - tot_len = -EFAULT; - break; - } + get_user(buf, &uiov32->iov_base)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (len > INT_MAX - tot_len) + len = INT_MAX - tot_len; + tot_len += len; kiov->iov_base = compat_ptr(buf); kiov->iov_len = (__kernel_size_t) len; --- a/net/core/iovec.c +++ b/net/core/iovec.c @@ -35,10 +35,9 @@ * in any case. */ -long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode) +int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode) { - int size, ct; - long err; + int size, ct, err; if (m->msg_namelen) { if (mode == VERIFY_READ) { @@ -60,14 +59,13 @@ long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, stru err = 0; for (ct = 0; ct < m->msg_iovlen; ct++) { - err += iov[ct].iov_len; - /* - * Goal is not to verify user data, but to prevent returning - * negative value, which is interpreted as errno. - * Overflow is still possible, but it is harmless. - */ - if (err < 0) - return -EMSGSIZE; + size_t len = iov[ct].iov_len; + + if (len > INT_MAX - err) { + len = INT_MAX - err; + iov[ct].iov_len = len; + } + err += len; } return err;