From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 4/4] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2010 17:32:45 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20101209173245.GB10206@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20101209173050.GA10206@mail.hallyn.com>
Changelog:
Dec 8: Fixed bug in my check_kill_permission pointed out by
Eric Biederman.
To test:
1. Test killing tasks as usual. No change.
2. Clone a new user namespace without a new pidns.
a. You CAN kill -CONT tasks in your thread group but outside
your user ns.
b. You can NOT otherwise kill tasks outside your user_ns.
c. Inside your new userns, signal semantics are as normal
with respect to userids, CAP_KILL, and thread groups.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
kernel/signal.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 4e3cff1..677025c 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -635,6 +635,27 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info)
(!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info));
}
+static inline int kill_ok_by_cred(struct cred *cred, struct cred *tcred)
+{
+ if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) {
+ /* userids are not equivalent - either you have the
+ capability to the target user ns or you don't */
+ if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */
+ if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
+ (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
+ (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) &&
+ (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) &&
+ !ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Bad permissions for sending the signal
* - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
@@ -659,11 +680,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
cred = current_cred();
tcred = __task_cred(t);
if (!same_thread_group(current, t) &&
- (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
- (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
- (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) &&
- (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) &&
- !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
+ !kill_ok_by_cred(cred, tcred)) {
switch (sig) {
case SIGCONT:
sid = task_session(t);
--
1.7.2.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-12-09 17:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-12-09 17:20 [RFC PATCH 1/4] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-09 17:28 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-09 17:30 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-09 17:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2010-12-10 11:16 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-10 16:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-11 0:50 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Alexey Dobriyan
2010-12-11 1:29 ` Eric W. Biederman
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