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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <michael.kerrisk@gmail.com>
Subject: [RFC 4/5] user namespaces: allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2010 15:26:59 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20101217152659.GD11162@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20101217152625.GC11162@mail.hallyn.com>

Changelog:
	Dec 8: Fixed bug in my check_kill_permission pointed out by
	       Eric Biederman.
	Dec 13: Apply Eric's suggestion to pass target task into kill_ok_by_cred()
	        for clarity

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 kernel/signal.c |   33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 4e3cff1..499bd36 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -636,6 +636,33 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info)
 }
 
 /*
+ * called with RCU read lock from check_kill_permission()
+ */
+static inline int kill_ok_by_cred(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+	struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	struct cred *tcred = __task_cred(t);
+
+	if (cred->user->user_ns != tcred->user->user_ns) {
+		/* userids are not equivalent - either you have the
+		   capability to the target user ns or you don't */
+		if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
+			return 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* same user namespace - usual credentials checks apply */
+	if ((cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
+	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
+	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
+	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
+	    !ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
  * Bad permissions for sending the signal
  * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
  */
@@ -659,11 +686,7 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
 	cred = current_cred();
 	tcred = __task_cred(t);
 	if (!same_thread_group(current, t) &&
-	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
-	    (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
-	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->suid) &&
-	    (cred->uid  ^ tcred->uid) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
+	    !kill_ok_by_cred(t)) {
 		switch (sig) {
 		case SIGCONT:
 			sid = task_session(t);
-- 
1.7.0.4


  reply	other threads:[~2010-12-17 15:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-12-17 15:22 [RFC 0/5] user namespaces: start clamping down Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:24 ` [RFC 1/5] user namespaces: Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:25   ` [RFC 2/5] user namespaces: make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:26     ` [RFC 3/5] user namespaces: allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:26       ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2010-12-17 15:27         ` [RFC 5/5] user namespaces: Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 19:45           ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-17 20:04             ` Serge Hallyn
2011-01-01  4:47             ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 19:31         ` [RFC 4/5] user namespaces: allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-17 20:09           ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 20:17             ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-17 20:22               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-01  4:45               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-01-01 23:10                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-01-02 14:39                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-12-17 15:56   ` [RFC 1/5] user namespaces: Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Alexey Dobriyan
2010-12-17 16:00     ` Alexey Dobriyan
2010-12-17 16:17       ` Serge Hallyn
2010-12-17 16:12     ` Serge Hallyn
2010-12-17 17:31   ` Greg KH
2010-12-17 19:26     ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-17 19:58       ` Greg KH
2010-12-17 20:40         ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-17 23:15           ` Greg KH
2010-12-18  6:32             ` Eric W. Biederman
2010-12-18 17:56               ` Greg KH
2010-12-17 19:46     ` Serge Hallyn
2010-12-17 19:57       ` Greg KH

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