From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
dhowells@redhat.com, oleg@mail.hallyn.com,
dlezcano@mail.hallyn.com,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 04/10] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2011 15:02:36 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110224150236.GD8262@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110224150150.GA8262@mail.hallyn.com>
Changelog:
Dec 8: Fixed bug in my check_kill_permission pointed out by
Eric Biederman.
Dec 13: Apply Eric's suggestion to pass target task into kill_ok_by_cred()
for clarity
Dec 31: address comment by Eric Biederman:
don't need cred/tcred in check_kill_permission.
Jan 1: use const cred struct.
Jan 11: Per Bastian Blank's advice, clean up kill_ok_by_cred().
Feb 16: kill_ok_by_cred: fix bad parentheses
Feb 23: per akpm, let compiler inline kill_ok_by_cred
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
---
kernel/signal.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 4e3cff1..12702b4 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -636,13 +636,33 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const struct siginfo *info)
}
/*
+ * called with RCU read lock from check_kill_permission()
+ */
+static int kill_ok_by_cred(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ const struct cred *tcred = __task_cred(t);
+
+ if (cred->user->user_ns == tcred->user->user_ns &&
+ (cred->euid == tcred->suid ||
+ cred->euid == tcred->uid ||
+ cred->uid == tcred->suid ||
+ cred->uid == tcred->uid))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_KILL))
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Bad permissions for sending the signal
* - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
*/
static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
struct task_struct *t)
{
- const struct cred *cred, *tcred;
struct pid *sid;
int error;
@@ -656,14 +676,8 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
if (error)
return error;
- cred = current_cred();
- tcred = __task_cred(t);
if (!same_thread_group(current, t) &&
- (cred->euid ^ tcred->suid) &&
- (cred->euid ^ tcred->uid) &&
- (cred->uid ^ tcred->suid) &&
- (cred->uid ^ tcred->uid) &&
- !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
+ !kill_ok_by_cred(t)) {
switch (sig) {
case SIGCONT:
sid = task_session(t);
--
1.7.0.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-02-24 15:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-02-24 15:01 [PATCH 01/10] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 02/10] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 03/10] allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 05/10] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 16:57 ` David Howells
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 06/10] user namespaces: convert all capable checks in kernel/sys.c Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 07/10] add a user namespace owner of ipc ns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 08/10] user namespaces: convert several capable() calls Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 09/10] userns: check user namespace for task->file uid equivalence checks Serge E. Hallyn
2011-03-01 22:24 ` Nathan Lynch
2011-03-01 23:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 10/10] rename is_owner_or_cap to inode_owner_or_capable Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 17:03 ` [PATCH 01/10] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace David Howells
2011-03-01 0:28 ` Andrew Morton
2011-03-01 5:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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