public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	containers@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	dhowells@redhat.com, oleg@mail.hallyn.com,
	dlezcano@mail.hallyn.com,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 06/10] user namespaces: convert all capable checks in kernel/sys.c
Date: Thu, 24 Feb 2011 15:02:51 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110224150251.GF8262@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110224150150.GA8262@mail.hallyn.com>

This allows setuid/setgid in containers.  It also fixes some
corner cases where kernel logic foregoes capability checks when
uids are equivalent.  The latter will need to be done throughout
the whole kernel.

Changelog:
	Jan 11: Use nsown_capable() as suggested by Bastian Blank.
	Jan 11: Fix logic errors in uid checks pointed out by Bastian.
	Feb 15: allow prlimit to current (was regression in previous version)
	Feb 23: remove debugging printks, uninline set_one_prio_perm and
		make it bool, and document its return value.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
---
 kernel/sys.c |   75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 7a1bbad..ba2b473 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -119,16 +119,33 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cad_pid);
 void (*pm_power_off_prepare)(void);
 
 /*
+ * Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid,
+ * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns.
+ *
+ * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe
+ */
+static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
+
+	if (pcred->user->user_ns == cred->user->user_ns &&
+	    (pcred->uid  == cred->euid ||
+	     pcred->euid == cred->euid))
+		return true;
+	if (ns_capable(pcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
  * set the priority of a task
  * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock
  */
 static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
 {
-	const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p);
 	int no_nice;
 
-	if (pcred->uid  != cred->euid &&
-	    pcred->euid != cred->euid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
+	if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) {
 		error = -EPERM;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -502,7 +519,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
 	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
 		if (old->gid == rgid ||
 		    old->egid == rgid ||
-		    capable(CAP_SETGID))
+		    nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
 			new->gid = rgid;
 		else
 			goto error;
@@ -511,7 +528,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid)
 		if (old->gid == egid ||
 		    old->egid == egid ||
 		    old->sgid == egid ||
-		    capable(CAP_SETGID))
+		    nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
 			new->egid = egid;
 		else
 			goto error;
@@ -546,7 +563,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid)
 	old = current_cred();
 
 	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
+	if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))
 		new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid;
 	else if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->sgid)
 		new->egid = new->fsgid = gid;
@@ -613,7 +630,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
 		new->uid = ruid;
 		if (old->uid != ruid &&
 		    old->euid != ruid &&
-		    !capable(CAP_SETUID))
+		    !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID))
 			goto error;
 	}
 
@@ -622,7 +639,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid)
 		if (old->uid != euid &&
 		    old->euid != euid &&
 		    old->suid != euid &&
-		    !capable(CAP_SETUID))
+		    !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID))
 			goto error;
 	}
 
@@ -670,7 +687,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid)
 	old = current_cred();
 
 	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+	if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 		new->suid = new->uid = uid;
 		if (uid != old->uid) {
 			retval = set_user(new);
@@ -712,7 +729,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid)
 	old = current_cred();
 
 	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+	if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 		if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && ruid != old->uid &&
 		    ruid != old->euid  && ruid != old->suid)
 			goto error;
@@ -776,7 +793,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid)
 	old = current_cred();
 
 	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
+	if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
 		if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid &&
 		    rgid != old->egid  && rgid != old->sgid)
 			goto error;
@@ -836,7 +853,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid)
 
 	if (uid == old->uid  || uid == old->euid  ||
 	    uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid ||
-	    capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
+	    nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
 		if (uid != old_fsuid) {
 			new->fsuid = uid;
 			if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
@@ -869,7 +886,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid)
 
 	if (gid == old->gid  || gid == old->egid  ||
 	    gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid ||
-	    capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
+	    nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
 		if (gid != old_fsgid) {
 			new->fsgid = gid;
 			goto change_okay;
@@ -1179,6 +1196,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len)
 
 	if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	down_write(&uts_sem);
@@ -1226,7 +1244,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len)
 	int errno;
 	char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1341,6 +1359,8 @@ int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
 	rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;
 	task_lock(tsk->group_leader);
 	if (new_rlim) {
+		/* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until
+		   cgroups can contain all limits */
 		if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max &&
 				!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
 			retval = -EPERM;
@@ -1384,19 +1404,22 @@ static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
 
-	tcred = __task_cred(task);
-	if (current != task &&
-	    (cred->uid != tcred->euid ||
-	     cred->uid != tcred->suid ||
-	     cred->uid != tcred->uid  ||
-	     cred->gid != tcred->egid ||
-	     cred->gid != tcred->sgid ||
-	     cred->gid != tcred->gid) &&
-	     !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) {
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
+	if (current == task)
+		return 0;
 
-	return 0;
+	tcred = __task_cred(task);
+	if (cred->user->user_ns == tcred->user->user_ns &&
+	    (cred->uid == tcred->euid &&
+	     cred->uid == tcred->suid &&
+	     cred->uid == tcred->uid  &&
+	     cred->gid == tcred->egid &&
+	     cred->gid == tcred->sgid &&
+	     cred->gid == tcred->gid))
+		return 0;
+	if (ns_capable(tcred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EPERM;
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource,
-- 
1.7.0.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-02-24 15:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-02-24 15:01 [PATCH 01/10] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 02/10] security: Make capabilities relative to the user namespace Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 03/10] allow sethostname in a container Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 04/10] allow killing tasks in your own or child userns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:02 ` [PATCH 05/10] Allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 16:57   ` David Howells
2011-02-24 15:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 07/10] add a user namespace owner of ipc ns Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 08/10] user namespaces: convert several capable() calls Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 09/10] userns: check user namespace for task->file uid equivalence checks Serge E. Hallyn
2011-03-01 22:24   ` Nathan Lynch
2011-03-01 23:07     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 15:03 ` [PATCH 10/10] rename is_owner_or_cap to inode_owner_or_capable Serge E. Hallyn
2011-02-24 17:03 ` [PATCH 01/10] Add a user_namespace as creator/owner of uts_namespace David Howells
2011-03-01  0:28 ` Andrew Morton
2011-03-01  5:37   ` Serge E. Hallyn

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20110224150251.GF8262@mail.hallyn.com \
    --to=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=akpm@osdl.org \
    --cc=containers@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=dlezcano@mail.hallyn.com \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mtk.manpages@gmail.com \
    --cc=oleg@mail.hallyn.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox