From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
serge@hallyn.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org,
eugeneteo@kernel.org, drosenberg@vsecurity.com,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Make it easier to harden /proc/
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2011 21:45:45 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201103162145.45772.arnd@arndb.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201103162108.17127.richard@nod.at>
On Wednesday 16 March 2011 21:08:16 Richard Weinberger wrote:
> Am Mittwoch 16 März 2011, 20:55:49 schrieb Kees Cook:
> > On Wed, Mar 16, 2011 at 08:31:47PM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> > > When containers like LXC are used a unprivileged and jailed
> > > root user can still write to critical files in /proc/.
> > > E.g: /proc/sys/kernel/{sysrq, panic, panic_on_oops, ... }
> > >
> > > This new restricted attribute makes it possible to protect such
> > > files. When restricted is set to true root needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> > > to into the file.
> >
> > I was thinking about this too. I'd prefer more fine-grained control
> > in this area, since some sysctl entries aren't strictly controlled by
> > CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. mmap_min_addr is already checking CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
> >
> > How about this instead?
>
> Good Idea.
> May we should also consider a per-directory restriction.
> Every file in /proc/sys/{kernel/, vm/, fs/, dev/} needs a protection.
> It would be much easier to set the protection on the parent directory
> instead of protecting file by file...
How does this interact with the per-namespace sysctls that Eric
Biederman added a few years ago?
I had expected that any dangerous sysctl would not be visible in
an unpriviledge container anyway.
Arnd
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
> > ---
> > diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> > index 8eb2522..5c5cfab 100644
> > --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> > +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
> > @@ -149,6 +149,10 @@ static ssize_t proc_sys_call_handler(struct file
> > *filp, void __user *buf, if (sysctl_perm(head->root, table, write ?
> > MAY_WRITE : MAY_READ)) goto out;
> >
> > + if (write && !cap_isclear(table->write_caps) &&
> > + !cap_issubset(table->write_caps,
> > current_cred()->cap_permitted)) + goto out;
> > +
> > /* if that can happen at all, it should be -EINVAL, not -EISDIR */
> > error = -EINVAL;
> > if (!table->proc_handler)
> > diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
> > index 11684d9..4e05493 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
> > @@ -1018,6 +1018,7 @@ struct ctl_table
> > void *data;
> > int maxlen;
> > mode_t mode;
> > + kernel_cap_t write_caps; /* Capabilities required to write */
> > struct ctl_table *child;
> > struct ctl_table *parent; /* Automatically set */
> > proc_handler *proc_handler; /* Callback for text formatting */
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-03-16 20:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-03-16 19:31 [PATCH] [RFC] Make it easier to harden /proc/ Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 19:55 ` Kees Cook
2011-03-16 20:08 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 20:45 ` Arnd Bergmann [this message]
2011-03-16 20:52 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 21:03 ` Arnd Bergmann
2011-03-16 21:04 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-03-16 21:07 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 21:15 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-03-17 10:14 ` Miquel van Smoorenburg
2011-03-17 10:57 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 21:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-03-16 21:23 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 21:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-03-17 6:41 ` Kees Cook
2011-03-17 7:30 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 21:19 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-03-17 16:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-03-19 10:43 ` Richard Weinberger
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