From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
serge@hallyn.com, eparis@redhat.com, jmorris@namei.org,
eugeneteo@kernel.org, drosenberg@vsecurity.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RFC] Make it easier to harden /proc/
Date: Sat, 19 Mar 2011 11:43:28 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201103191143.28499.richard@nod.at> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <m1mxktbsgy.fsf@fess.ebiederm.org>
Am Donnerstag 17 März 2011, 17:51:41 schrieb Eric W. Biederman:
> Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> writes:
> > On Wed, Mar 16, 2011 at 09:08:16PM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> >> Kees,
> >>
> >> Am Mittwoch 16 März 2011, 20:55:49 schrieb Kees Cook:
> >> > Hi Richard,
> >> >
> >> > On Wed, Mar 16, 2011 at 08:31:47PM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> >> > > When containers like LXC are used a unprivileged and jailed
> >> > > root user can still write to critical files in /proc/.
> >> > > E.g: /proc/sys/kernel/{sysrq, panic, panic_on_oops, ... }
> >> > >
> >> > > This new restricted attribute makes it possible to protect such
> >> > > files. When restricted is set to true root needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> >> > > to into the file.
> >> >
> >> > I was thinking about this too. I'd prefer more fine-grained control
> >> > in this area, since some sysctl entries aren't strictly controlled by
> >> > CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. mmap_min_addr is already checking CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
> >> >
> >> > How about this instead?
> >>
> >> Good Idea.
> >> May we should also consider a per-directory restriction.
> >> Every file in /proc/sys/{kernel/, vm/, fs/, dev/} needs a protection.
> >> It would be much easier to set the protection on the parent directory
> >> instead of protecting file by file...
> >
> > Of course, not.
> >
> > You should _enable_ them one by one, not the other way around.
> >
> > "default deny"
>
> Right.
>
> Since the primary problem here is containers we can use the
> user_namespace to add the default deny policy.
>
> Something like the trivial patch below should make /proc/sys safe,
> and the technique applies in general.
>
> Richard is that a good enough example to get you started?
Yes. Thanks.
> Eric
>
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index 0f1bd83..a172a9d 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -1674,10 +1674,12 @@ void register_sysctl_root(struct ctl_table_root
> *root)
>
> static int test_perm(int mode, int op)
> {
> - if (!current_euid())
> - mode >>= 6;
> - else if (in_egroup_p(0))
> - mode >>= 3;
> + if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns) {
> + if (!current_euid())
> + mode >>= 6;
> + else if (in_egroup_p(0))
> + mode >>= 3;
> + }
> if ((op & ~mode & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC)) == 0)
> return 0;
> return -EACCES;
prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-03-19 10:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-03-16 19:31 [PATCH] [RFC] Make it easier to harden /proc/ Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 19:55 ` Kees Cook
2011-03-16 20:08 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 20:45 ` Arnd Bergmann
2011-03-16 20:52 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 21:03 ` Arnd Bergmann
2011-03-16 21:04 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-03-16 21:07 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 21:15 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-03-17 10:14 ` Miquel van Smoorenburg
2011-03-17 10:57 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 21:17 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-03-16 21:23 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 21:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-03-17 6:41 ` Kees Cook
2011-03-17 7:30 ` Richard Weinberger
2011-03-16 21:19 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-03-17 16:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-03-19 10:43 ` Richard Weinberger [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=201103191143.28499.richard@nod.at \
--to=richard@nod.at \
--cc=adobriyan@gmail.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=drosenberg@vsecurity.com \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=eparis@redhat.com \
--cc=eugeneteo@kernel.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=kees.cook@canonical.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox