From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932559Ab1DYUZz (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Apr 2011 16:25:55 -0400 Received: from 1wt.eu ([62.212.114.60]:34627 "EHLO 1wt.eu" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932537Ab1DYUZs (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Apr 2011 16:25:48 -0400 Message-Id: <20110425200239.119096077@pcw.home.local> User-Agent: quilt/0.48-1 Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2011 22:04:53 +0200 From: Willy Tarreau To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org, stable-review@kernel.org Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov , Patrick McHardy , Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH 141/173] ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace In-Reply-To: <46075c3a3ef08be6d70339617d6afc98@local> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 2.6.27.59-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know. ------------------ From: Vasiliy Kulikov commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream. Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process. The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN. Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -1323,6 +1323,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, void __user /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1855,6 +1856,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -2079,6 +2081,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd ret = -EFAULT; break; } + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0; if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET) target = 1;