From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756045Ab1E0NvK (ORCPT ); Fri, 27 May 2011 09:51:10 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:9035 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754404Ab1E0NvG (ORCPT ); Fri, 27 May 2011 09:51:06 -0400 Date: Fri, 27 May 2011 09:50:15 -0400 From: Vivek Goyal To: Dan Rosenberg Cc: Tony Luck , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, davej@redhat.com, kees.cook@canonical.com, davem@davemloft.net, eranian@google.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, adobriyan@gmail.com, penberg@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, Arjan van de Ven , Andrew Morton , Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, Ingo Molnar , pageexec@freemail.hu Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH] Randomize kernel base address on boot Message-ID: <20110527135015.GC8053@redhat.com> References: <1306269105.21443.20.camel@dan> <20110526203502.GK29496@redhat.com> <20110526204030.GL29496@redhat.com> <1306442674.2279.29.camel@dan> <20110527131313.GB8053@redhat.com> <1306502492.3339.2.camel@dan> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1306502492.3339.2.camel@dan> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Fri, May 27, 2011 at 09:21:32AM -0400, Dan Rosenberg wrote: > On Fri, 2011-05-27 at 09:13 -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote: > > On Thu, May 26, 2011 at 04:44:34PM -0400, Dan Rosenberg wrote: > > > On Thu, 2011-05-26 at 16:40 -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote: > > > > On Thu, May 26, 2011 at 04:35:02PM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote: > > > > > On Tue, May 24, 2011 at 04:31:45PM -0400, Dan Rosenberg wrote: > > > > > > This introduces CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, which randomizes the address at > > > > > > which the kernel is decompressed at boot as a security feature that > > > > > > deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location of kernel > > > > > > internals. The default values of the kptr_restrict and dmesg_restrict > > > > > > sysctls are set to (1) when this is enabled, since hiding kernel > > > > > > pointers is necessary to preserve the secrecy of the randomized base > > > > > > address. > > > > > > > > > > What happens to /proc/iomem interface which gives us the physical memory > > > > > location where kernel is loaded. kexec-tools relies on that interface > > > > > heavily so we can not take it away. And if we can not take it away then > > > > > I think somebody should be easibly be able to calculate this randomized > > > > > base address. > > > > > > Is it common to run kexec-tools as non-root? It may be necessary to > > > restrict this interface to root when randomization is used (keep in mind > > > nobody's going to force you to turn this on by default, at least for the > > > foreseeable future). > > > > Dan, > > > > I had a stupid question. /proc/kallsyms is also readable by root only. So > > if we are doing this so that non-root user can not know kernel virtual and > > physical address that should be already covered as non-root users can't > > read /proc/kallsysm or /boot/System.map. > > > > Not sure what system you're running, but /proc/kallsyms is 0444 on my > machine (and in mainline, afaik). Likewise for /proc/iomem. Sorry. I read it wrong. Yes /proc/iomem and /proc/kallsyms are 0444. > > The problem is mainly with distribution kernels - it's trivial to just > grab an identical vmlinux to a target machine and then you instantly > know exactly where everything is. > > > And if this randomization is also to protect information from root user > > then /proc/iomem exporting the physical address of kernel is still a > > valid question in that context. > > > > I think we can deal with unprivileged users first, and if we want to > truly prevent root from finding this out, we can introduce a separate > toggle that locks things down further. Ok, given the fact that /proc/iomem is 0444 and it carries the physical address of kernel, it think it should be easy to calcualte the randomized offset. So I guess we shall have to do something about that too. Thanks Vivek