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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Stephen Wilson <wilsons@start.ca>,
	KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>,
	security@kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2011 15:42:11 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110629114211.GA29701@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <BANLkTi=dTHGK1QVs+g2tA6WocQ64SPPF3g@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Jun 29, 2011 at 06:57 +0530, Balbir Singh wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 5:39 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> > taskstats information may be used for gathering private information.
> > E.g. for openssh and vsftpd daemons read_characters/write_characters may
> > be used to learn the precise password length.  Restrict it to processes
> > being able to ptrace the target process.
> >
> > For TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_REGISTER_CPUMASK the fix is euid check instead of
> > a ptrace check as the handler is processed in the context of the target
> > process, not the listener process'.  When ptrace_task_may_access_current()
> > is introduced, it should be used instead of euid check.  Currently there
> > is a small race when a process temporarily changes its euid (e.g. to
> > access user's files), until the process sets euid back user's processes
> > may gather privileged process' statistics.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
> > ---
> >  kernel/taskstats.c |   23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >  1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/taskstats.c b/kernel/taskstats.c
> > index 9ffea36..d92c95a 100644
> > --- a/kernel/taskstats.c
> > +++ b/kernel/taskstats.c
> > @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
> >  #include <linux/cgroup.h>
> >  #include <linux/fs.h>
> >  #include <linux/file.h>
> > +#include <linux/ptrace.h>
> >  #include <net/genetlink.h>
> >  #include <asm/atomic.h>
> >
> > @@ -132,6 +133,8 @@ static void send_cpu_listeners(struct sk_buff *skb,
> >        struct sk_buff *skb_next, *skb_cur = skb;
> >        void *reply = genlmsg_data(genlhdr);
> >        int rc, delcount = 0;
> > +       const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
> > +       struct task_struct *task;
> >
> >        rc = genlmsg_end(skb, reply);
> >        if (rc < 0) {
> > @@ -142,6 +145,15 @@ static void send_cpu_listeners(struct sk_buff *skb,
> >        rc = 0;
> >        down_read(&listeners->sem);
> 
> Why not grab RCU lock here

Yes, it makes sense.  I was thinking about not holding a lock for a too
long time, but it should be rather cheap anyway.


Thank you,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

  reply	other threads:[~2011-06-29 11:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-06-24 12:09 [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29  1:27 ` Balbir Singh
2011-06-29 11:42   ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-06-29 20:17   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-02  7:36     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-04  2:57       ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-04 17:45         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07  8:55           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-07 11:53             ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-07 16:23               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-09 15:36                 ` Balbir Singh
2011-07-11 14:07                   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 20:09 ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2011-06-30  7:57   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 10:59     ` Balbir Singh
2011-06-30 12:08       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 16:40       ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-01  3:02         ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 16:40           ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-19 17:20             ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 17:39             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-19 17:45               ` Linus Torvalds
2011-09-20  3:35                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2011-09-20  5:47                 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2011-09-19 17:47               ` Balbir Singh
2011-09-19 18:29             ` Andi Kleen
2011-09-19 18:32               ` Linus Torvalds

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