public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	rientjes@google.com, wilsons@start.ca, security@kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v3] proc: fix a race in do_io_accounting()
Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2011 20:34:14 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110706163412.GA4743@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110705141301.0d3594e0.akpm@linux-foundation.org>

If inode's mode permits to open /proc/PID/io and the resulted file
descriptor is kept across execve() of setuid or similar binary, the
ptrace_may_access() check tries to prevent using this fd against the
task with escalated privileges.  Unfortunately, there is a race of the
check against execve().  If execve() is processed after the ptrace
check, but before the actual io information gathering, io statistics
will be gathered from the privileged process.  At least in theory this
might lead to gathering sensible information (like ssh/ftp password
length) that wouldn't be available otherwise.

Holding task->signal->cred_guard_mutex while gathering the io
information should protect against the race.

The order of locking is similar to the one inside of
ptrace_attach(): first goes cred_guard_mutex, then lock_task_sighand().

v3 - better description.
v2 - use mutex_lock_killable() instead of mutex_lock().

Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
---
 fs/proc/base.c |   16 +++++++++++++---
 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 083a4f2..4b9f159 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2711,9 +2711,16 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
 {
 	struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	int result;
 
-	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
-		return -EACCES;
+	result = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	if (result)
+		return result;
+
+	if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
+		result = -EACCES;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
 
 	if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
 		struct task_struct *t = task;
@@ -2724,7 +2731,7 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
 
 		unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
 	}
-	return sprintf(buffer,
+	result = sprintf(buffer,
 			"rchar: %llu\n"
 			"wchar: %llu\n"
 			"syscr: %llu\n"
@@ -2739,6 +2746,9 @@ static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
 			(unsigned long long)acct.read_bytes,
 			(unsigned long long)acct.write_bytes,
 			(unsigned long long)acct.cancelled_write_bytes);
+out_unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+	return result;
 }
 
 static int proc_tid_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
-- 
1.7.0.4


  reply	other threads:[~2011-07-06 16:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-07-03 10:39 [PATCH] proc: fix a race in do_io_accounting() Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 19:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 20:01   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-04 20:13   ` [PATCH v2] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-05 21:13     ` Andrew Morton
2011-07-06 16:34       ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-07-15  6:38         ` [PATCH v3] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-15 16:14           ` Linus Torvalds

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20110706163412.GA4743@albatros \
    --to=segoon@openwall.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=rientjes@google.com \
    --cc=security@kernel.org \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=wilsons@start.ca \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox