From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Cc: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de>,
kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch v2] x86: kvm: x86: fix information leak to userland
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2011 21:28:09 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110726172809.GA23970@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ABD7343A-6440-4CC0-B8B0-9D27EF0291B0@suse.de>
Alexander,
On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 19:05 +0200, Alexander Graf wrote:
> > @@ -2623,6 +2626,7 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > dbgregs->dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6;
> > dbgregs->dr7 = vcpu->arch.dr7;
> > dbgregs->flags = 0;
> > + memset(&dbgregs->reserved, 0, sizeof(dbgregs->reserved));
> > }
> >
> > static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > @@ -3106,6 +3110,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
> > sizeof(ps->channels));
> > ps->flags = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags;
> > mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
> > + memset(&ps->reserved, 0, sizeof(ps->reserved));
>
> struct kvm_pit_state2 {
> struct kvm_pit_channel_state channels[3];
> __u32 flags;
> __u32 reserved[9];
> };
>
> So memset(&ps->reserved) would give you the a __u32 **, no? Same goes for all the other array sets in here. Or am I understanding some C logic wrong? :)
No, the array name and an address of the array give the same address. I
could use ps->reserved instead of &ps->reserved, but it is a question of
coding style. I got opposite opinions on this question from different
maintainers.
Another thing is that sizeof() of the array name and the pointer to the
first array element differ. But I used sizeof(array) here, so it should
be correct.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-07-26 17:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-10-30 14:11 [PATCH v2] x86: kvm: fix information leak to userland Vasiliy Kulikov
2010-10-30 14:34 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-10-30 15:31 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2010-10-30 15:46 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-10-30 18:54 ` [patch v2] x86: kvm: x86: " Vasiliy Kulikov
2010-11-01 17:19 ` Marcelo Tosatti
2011-07-26 17:05 ` Alexander Graf
2011-07-26 17:24 ` Avi Kivity
2011-07-26 17:38 ` Alexander Graf
2011-07-26 17:28 ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-07-26 17:39 ` Alexander Graf
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