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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/interrupts
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 00:11:20 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20111107201120.GA5775@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4EB83674.3040207@zytor.com>

On Mon, Nov 07, 2011 at 11:50 -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 11/07/2011 11:48 AM, Eric Paris wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 7, 2011 at 2:29 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> >> On Mon, Nov 07, 2011 at 11:18 -0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> > 
> >> As to procfs, I see no real need of adding mode/group mount option for
> >> global procfs files (/proc/interrupts, /proc/stat, etc.) - it can be
> >> done by distro specific init scripts (chown+chmod).  I don't mind
> >> against such an option for the convenience, though.
> > 
> > While possible, the chmod+chown 'solutions' just aren't as simple as
> > you pretend.  Every time one creates a chroot environment and mounts
> > /proc it has be manually fixed there as well.  Same thing with a
> > container.  Sure if /proc were something that was only ever mounted
> > one time on a box it wouldn't be so bad, but that's not the case.....
> 
> Yes, for a filesystem that dynamically creates nodes, a static script
> just doesn't work well.  Control options do, like we have for devpts for
> example.

My statement was about static files - /proc/{interrupts,meminfo,stat,cpuinfo}.
They don't change during the system life.  /proc/$PID/* files are indeed
dymanic and the first link in my quoted email was about addition of such
mount options.

Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

  reply	other threads:[~2011-11-07 20:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-11-07 17:45 [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/interrupts Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 18:06 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-11-07 19:01   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 19:18     ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 19:29       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 19:48         ` Eric Paris
2011-11-07 19:50           ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 20:11             ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-11-07 20:47               ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 21:23                 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-11-07 21:35                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 23:07                     ` Linus Torvalds
2011-11-07 23:21                       ` Alan Cox
2011-11-07 23:27                         ` Greg KH
2011-11-07 23:40                           ` Theodore Tso
2011-11-07 23:45                             ` Alan Cox
2011-11-07 23:45                             ` Greg KH
2011-11-08 20:07                               ` Ted Ts'o
2011-11-09 16:14                                 ` Greg KH
2011-11-08  9:11                           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-08 13:23                             ` Alan Cox
2011-11-08 17:41                               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-08 17:06                   ` John Stoffel
2011-11-07 19:54           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 20:10       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-11-07 20:19         ` Vasiliy Kulikov

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