From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/interrupts
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 00:19:08 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20111107201908.GA5827@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <14202.1320696659@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
On Mon, Nov 07, 2011 at 15:10 -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On Mon, 07 Nov 2011 11:18:32 PST, "H. Peter Anvin" said:
>
> > I would like to propose that we add a mount option to procfs, and
> > possibly sysfs, called, say, admingrp. These kinds of files then get
> > restricted to the admingrp (defaulting to gid 0 if no admingrp is
> > provided). Historically on Unix there has been a group of people
> > (usually "adm", but sometimes "log") who are allowed to read (but not
> > write) the log files, which also contains potentially sensitive information.
>
> Probably should be a two part - mount with 'gid=NNN', and then a
> perm=027 or whatever, to be treated similar to a umask. So 027
> would allow root to do anything, would disable write for the gid= group,
> and turn it off completely for others. Less paranoid sites could mount
> it with perm=002.
>
> Does that cover most of the use cases?
At the time of Linux 2.0-2.4 in Owl patch there was a plain on/off
configure option - 022 / 066 umask. Currently procfs restriction is
implemented in Grsecurity with the same all-or-nothing approach.
Brad Spengler told me that there were no user complains about the lack of
flexibility :-) So, I agree that we don't need anything more complex.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-11-07 20:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-11-07 17:45 [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/interrupts Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 18:06 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-11-07 19:01 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 19:18 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 19:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 19:48 ` Eric Paris
2011-11-07 19:50 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 20:11 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 20:47 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 21:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-11-07 21:35 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 23:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-11-07 23:21 ` Alan Cox
2011-11-07 23:27 ` Greg KH
2011-11-07 23:40 ` Theodore Tso
2011-11-07 23:45 ` Alan Cox
2011-11-07 23:45 ` Greg KH
2011-11-08 20:07 ` Ted Ts'o
2011-11-09 16:14 ` Greg KH
2011-11-08 9:11 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-08 13:23 ` Alan Cox
2011-11-08 17:41 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-08 17:06 ` John Stoffel
2011-11-07 19:54 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 20:10 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-11-07 20:19 ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20111107201908.GA5827@albatros \
--to=segoon@openwall.com \
--cc=Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu \
--cc=adobriyan@gmail.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox