From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756254Ab1KOPUc (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Nov 2011 10:20:32 -0500 Received: from mail-ey0-f174.google.com ([209.85.215.174]:37144 "EHLO mail-ey0-f174.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753695Ab1KOPUa (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Nov 2011 10:20:30 -0500 Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 07:20:23 -0800 From: Tejun Heo To: Pavel Emelyanov Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List , Cyrill Gorcunov , Glauber Costa , Andi Kleen , Andrew Morton , Matt Helsley Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] Routine for generating an safe ID for kernel pointer Message-ID: <20111115152023.GA18919@google.com> References: <4EC24E9E.8040502@parallels.com> <4EC24EC1.7060203@parallels.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <4EC24EC1.7060203@parallels.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 15, 2011 at 03:36:33PM +0400, Pavel Emelyanov wrote: > +unsigned long gen_object_id(void *ptr) > +{ > + if (!ptr) > + return 0; > + > + if (unlikely(!ptr_poison)) { > + spin_lock(&ptr_poison_lock); > + if (!ptr_poison) > + get_random_bytes(&ptr_poison, sizeof(ptr_poison)); > + spin_unlock(&ptr_poison_lock); > + } One thing that worries me about this is that there's one ptr_poison for all id's and any single leak of a pointer value will make all ids vulnerable. If we're going to do this, let's segregate different id spaces and use different poison values for each. Thank you. -- tejun