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From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>,
	Glauber Costa <glommer@parallels.com>,
	Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
	Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] Checkpoint/Restore: Show in proc IDs of objects that can be shared between tasks
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2011 12:48:31 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20111117124831.688adbeb.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4EC4DA15.7090106@parallels.com>

On Thu, 17 Nov 2011 13:55:33 +0400
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> wrote:

> While doing the checkpoint-restore in the userspace one need to determine
> whether various kernel objects (like mm_struct-s of file_struct-s) are shared
> between tasks and restore this state.
> 
> The 2nd step can for now be solved by using respective CLONE_XXX flags and
> the unshare syscall, while there's currently no ways for solving the 1st one.
> 
> One of the ways for checking whether two tasks share e.g. an mm_struct is to
> provide some mm_struct ID of a task to its proc file. The best from the
> performance point of view ID is the object address in the kernel, but showing
> them to the userspace is not good for security reasons.
> 
> Thus the object address is XOR-ed with a "random" value of the same size and 
> then shown in proc. Providing this poison is not leaked into the userspace then
> ID seem to be safe. The objects for which the IDs are shown are:
> 
> * all namespaces living in /proc/pid/ns/
> * open files (shown in /proc/pid/fdinfo/)
> * objects, that can be shared with CLONE_XXX flags (except for namespaces)
> 
> Changes since
> v1: * Tejun worried about the single poison value was a weak side - leaking one
>       makes all the IDs vulnerable. To address this several poison values - one
>       per object type - are introduced. They are stored in a plain array. Tejun, 
>       is this enough from your POV, or you'd like to see them widely scattered 
>       over the memory?
>     * Pekka proposed to initialized poison values in the late_initcall callback
>     * ... and move the code to mm/util.c
> 
> Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>

It doesn't *sound* terribly secure.  There might be clever ways in
which userspace can determine the secret mask, dunno.  We should ask
evil-minded security people to review this proposal.

Why not simply use a sequence number, increment it each time we create
an mm_struct?  On could use an idr tree to prevent duplicates but it
would be simpler and sufficient to make it 64-bit and we never have to
worry about wraparound causing duplicates.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-11-17 20:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-11-17  9:55 [PATCH v2 0/4] Checkpoint/Restore: Show in proc IDs of objects that can be shared between tasks Pavel Emelyanov
2011-11-17  9:56 ` [PATCH 1/4] Routine for generating a safe ID for kernel pointer Pavel Emelyanov
2011-11-17  9:56 ` [PATCH 2/4] proc: Show namespaces IDs in /proc/pid/ns/* files Pavel Emelyanov
2011-11-17  9:56 ` [PATCH 3/4] proc: Show open file ID in /proc/pid/fdinfo/* Pavel Emelyanov
2011-11-17 20:48 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2011-11-18  9:24   ` [PATCH v2 0/4] Checkpoint/Restore: Show in proc IDs of objects that can be shared between tasks Pavel Emelyanov
2011-11-18 19:07     ` Andrew Morton
2011-11-18 20:03       ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2011-11-18 20:37         ` Andrew Morton
2011-11-18 21:03           ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2011-11-18 21:09             ` Pekka Enberg
2011-11-18 22:10               ` Kyle Moffett
2011-11-18 23:46                 ` Tejun Heo
2011-11-19  1:09                   ` Kyle Moffett
2011-11-19  5:30                     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2011-11-18 23:38             ` Matt Helsley
2011-11-19  5:35               ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2011-11-19  7:57       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-19  8:10         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-19  8:18           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-19 15:34           ` Cyrill Gorcunov

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