Re: [PATCH v2] sctp: better integer overflow check in sctp_auth_create_key()

[David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>]

From: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 29 Nov 2011 14:26:30 -0500

> The check from commit 30c2235c is incomplete and cannot prevent
> cases like key_len = 0x80000000 (INT_MAX + 1).  In that case, the
> left-hand side of the check (INT_MAX - key_len), which is unsigned,
> becomes 0xffffffff (UINT_MAX) and bypasses the check.
> 
> However this shouldn't be a security issue.  The function is called
> from the following two code paths:
> 
>  1) setsockopt()
> 
>  2) sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret()
> 
> In case (1), sca_keylength is never going to exceed 65535 since it's
> bounded by a u16 from the user API.  As such, the key length will
> never overflow.
> 
> In case (2), sca_keylength is computed based on the user key (1 short)
> and 2 * key_vector (3 shorts) for a total of 7 * USHRT_MAX, which still
> will not overflow.
> 
> In other words, this overflow check is not really necessary.  Just
> make it more correct.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>

I already applied your patch, you cannot just post a patch as if
it hasn't been applied to the tree, it doesn't work like that.

Once I've applied one of your patches, it is "cast in stone" and
cannot be reverted.  You must therefore develop relative to the
change.