From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security: Yama LSM
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2011 09:36:59 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20111220053659.GC2537@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20111220053541.GB2537@albatros>
Sorry, dropped James from cc.
On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 09:35 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 07:52 +1100, James Morris wrote:
> > On Mon, 19 Dec 2011, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 11:33:10AM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 15 Dec 2011, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
> > > > > + ns->ptrace_scope = parent_pid_ns->ptrace_scope;
> > > > > +#endif
> > > > > +
> > > >
> > > > I'd like to see this implemented as an LSM hook, something like
> > > > security_ptrace_set_scope().
> > >
> > > I must be dense, but I fail to understand the purpose of this. The "ptrace
> > > scope" implemented by Yama is a sysctl, not an system interface. I don't
> > > understand why (or where) other LSMs would want to catch changing this.
> > > Can you explain what you're looking for in more detail?
> > >
> >
> > We should not see YAMA-specific code in the core kernel. However you do
> > it, the above should happen in LSM.
>
> Probably this should be security_pid_namespace_create() instead of
> security_ptrace_set_scope()? (Or even use create an analog of
> register_pernet_subsys() for pid_ns.)
>
> Then have ->ptrace_scope and similar things as per-LSM private variables
> like in task_struct->cred->security. ns->security should be dynamically
> allocated.
>
> Thanks,
>
> --
> Vasiliy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-12-20 5:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-12-16 6:33 [PATCH v8 0/2] security: Yama LSM Kees Cook
2011-12-16 6:33 ` [PATCH 1/2] security: create task_free security callback Kees Cook
2011-12-16 6:33 ` [PATCH 2/2] security: Yama LSM Kees Cook
2011-12-19 0:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2011-12-19 19:41 ` Kees Cook
2011-12-19 20:52 ` James Morris
2011-12-19 22:22 ` Kees Cook
2011-12-20 5:35 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-12-20 5:36 ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2011-12-19 22:17 [PATCH v9 0/2] " Kees Cook
2011-12-19 22:17 ` [PATCH 2/2] " Kees Cook
2011-12-21 5:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " John Johansen
2011-12-21 20:18 ` Kees Cook
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