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From: Nick Bowler <nbowler@elliptictech.com>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>,
	Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>,
	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Ubuntu security discussion <ubuntu-hardened@lists.ubuntu.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pageexec@freemail.hu,
	spender@grsecurity.net
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: Add overflow protection to kref
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2012 14:35:57 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120224193557.GB8140@elliptictech.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20120224191300.GA12553@albatros>

On 2012-02-24 23:13 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 14:05 -0500, Nick Bowler wrote:
> > On 2012-02-24 10:52 -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 10:37 AM, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Feb 24, 2012 at 12:58:35PM -0500, David Windsor wrote:
> > [...]
> > > >> diff --git a/include/linux/kref.h b/include/linux/kref.h
> > > >> index 9c07dce..fc0756a 100644
> > > >> --- a/include/linux/kref.h
> > > >> +++ b/include/linux/kref.h
> > > >> @@ -38,8 +38,12 @@ static inline void kref_init(struct kref *kref)
> > > >>   */
> > > >>  static inline void kref_get(struct kref *kref)
> > > >>  {
> > > >> +   int rc = 0;
> > > >>     WARN_ON(!atomic_read(&kref->refcount));
> > > >> -   atomic_inc(&kref->refcount);
> > > >> +   smp_mb__before_atomic_inc();
> > > >> +   rc = atomic_add_unless(&kref->refcount, 1, INT_MAX);
> > > >> +   smp_mb__after_atomic_inc();
> > > >> +   BUG_ON(!rc);
> > > >
> > > > So you are guaranteeing to crash a machine here if this fails?  And you
> > > > were trying to say this is a "security" based fix?
> > > 
> > > This is the same principle as the stack protector. When something has
> > > gone horribly wrong and cannot be sensibly recovered from, crash the
> > > machine. Wrapping the refcount would cause all kinds of problems, so
> > > that certainly seems worthy of a BUG().
> > 
> > But in this case, the principle does not apply because we can recover.
> > The reason we cannot recover from the stack protector case is because
> > the stack protector is reacting after the fact, which is not the case
> > here.  Simply peg the reference count at the maximum value, neither
> > incrementing it nor decrementing it further.
> 
> ...and simply loose one reference, which leads to use-after-free.

Please explain how a use-after-free could possibly occur if the
reference count is never incremented or decremented again?

Cheers,
-- 
Nick Bowler, Elliptic Technologies (http://www.elliptictech.com/)


  reply	other threads:[~2012-02-24 19:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <CAEXv5_gkTsPHDFh+wQqD3P3D-Z+uCN-_1bVyHfHV=u7bS-tgeA@mail.gmail.com>
2012-02-16 20:45 ` Add overflow protection to kref Kees Cook
2012-02-17  0:24   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2012-02-17  1:06     ` Kees Cook
2012-02-17  1:40       ` Greg KH
2012-02-17  2:11         ` [ubuntu-hardened] " Kees Cook
2012-02-17  2:48           ` David Windsor
2012-02-17  3:32             ` Greg KH
2012-02-17  6:33             ` Alexey Dobriyan
2012-02-17 13:23         ` pageexec
2012-02-17  7:59     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2012-02-17 17:53       ` Greg KH
2012-02-17 17:54       ` Greg KH
2012-02-17 19:37         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2012-02-17 23:39           ` Djalal Harouni
2012-02-18  1:44             ` Roland Dreier
2012-02-18 16:15               ` David Windsor
2012-02-18 16:35                 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2012-02-18 16:18               ` Greg KH
2012-02-24 17:58                 ` David Windsor
2012-02-24 18:37                   ` Greg KH
2012-02-24 18:52                     ` Kees Cook
2012-02-24 19:05                       ` Nick Bowler
2012-02-24 19:13                         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2012-02-24 19:35                           ` Nick Bowler [this message]
2012-02-24 21:59                           ` PaX Team
2012-02-24 18:58                     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2012-02-24 19:41                       ` Greg KH
2012-02-24 20:04                         ` Kees Cook
2012-02-24 19:04                     ` David Windsor
2012-02-24 22:14                       ` PaX Team

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