public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
To: Auke Kok <auke-jan.h.kok@intel.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Trace event for capable().
Date: Fri, 18 May 2012 17:25:07 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120518222507.GA7188@sergelap> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1337284200-1838-1-git-send-email-auke-jan.h.kok@intel.com>

Quoting Auke Kok (auke-jan.h.kok@intel.com):
> Add a simple trace event for capable().
> 
> There's been a lot of discussion around capable(), and there
> are plenty of tools to help reduce capabilities' usage from
> userspace. A major gap however is that it's almost impossible
> to see or verify which bits are requested from either userspace
> or in the kernel.
> 
> This patch adds a minimal tracer that will print out which
> CAPs are requested and whether the request was granted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Auke Kok <auke-jan.h.kok@intel.com>
> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

Hi,

is there any measurable performance impact by this patch?  (Have you
measured it?)

I'm not familiar enough with the tracing stuff, but if the tracing is
done so there's no impact when not tracing, then I have no problem with
this.  It could be quite useful as you say.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>

thanks,
-serge

> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> ---
>  include/trace/events/capabilities.h |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  kernel/capability.c                 |    5 +++++
>  2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capabilities.h
> 
> diff --git a/include/trace/events/capabilities.h b/include/trace/events/capabilities.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..97997fa
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/trace/events/capabilities.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
> +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
> +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capabilities
> +
> +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITIES_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
> +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITIES_H
> +
> +#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
> +
> +TRACE_EVENT(capable,
> +
> +	TP_PROTO(pid_t pid, int cap, bool rc),
> +
> +	TP_ARGS(pid, cap, rc),
> +
> +	TP_STRUCT__entry(
> +		__field(pid_t, pid)
> +		__field(int, cap)
> +		__field(bool, rc)
> +	),
> +
> +	TP_fast_assign(
> +		__entry->pid = pid;
> +		__entry->cap = cap;
> +		__entry->rc = rc;
> +	),
> +
> +	TP_printk("pid=%d cap=%d rc=%d", __entry->pid, __entry->cap, __entry->rc)
> +);
> +
> +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITIES_H */
> +
> +/* This part must be outside protection */
> +#include <trace/define_trace.h>
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index 3f1adb6..2941f37 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
>  #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
>  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
>  
> +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
> +#include <trace/events/capabilities.h>
> +
>  /*
>   * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
>   */
> @@ -386,8 +389,10 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>  
>  	if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
>  		current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> +		trace_capable(current->pid, cap, true);
>  		return true;
>  	}
> +	trace_capable(current->pid, cap, false);
>  	return false;
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
> -- 
> 1.7.10
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2012-05-18 22:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-05-17 19:50 [PATCH] Trace event for capable() Auke Kok
2012-05-18 22:25 ` Serge Hallyn [this message]
2012-05-18 23:11   ` Kok, Auke-jan H
2012-05-18 22:33 ` richard -rw- weinberger
2012-05-18 23:09   ` Kok, Auke-jan H
2012-05-18 23:19     ` Serge Hallyn
2012-05-20 13:10       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2012-05-19  6:59 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-05-19 18:39   ` Kok, Auke-jan H
2012-05-22  0:03     ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-05-22  2:17       ` Kok, Auke-jan H
2012-05-22 14:50         ` Eric W. Biederman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20120518222507.GA7188@sergelap \
    --to=serge.hallyn@canonical.com \
    --cc=auke-jan.h.kok@intel.com \
    --cc=eparis@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox