From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
kyle@mcmartin.ca, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/23] Crypto keys and module signing
Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2012 18:53:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120622015341.GA3414@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87r4u6w58c.fsf@rustcorp.com.au>
On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 03:11:23PM +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:
> > > > Why would you want multiple signatures? That just complicates things.
> > >
> > > The code above stays pretty simple; if the signature fails, you set size
> > > to i, and loop again. As I said, if you know exactly how you're going
> > > to strip the modules, you can avoid storing the stripped module and
> > > simply append both signatures.
> >
> > You still haven't justified it. One of your arguments about rejecting the ELF
> > parsing version was that it was too big for no useful extra value that I could
> > justify. Supporting multiple signatures adds extra size and complexity for no
> > obvious value.
>
> One loop is a lot easier to justify that the ELF-parsing mess. And it
> can be done in a backwards compatible way tomorrow: old kernels will
> only check the last signature.
>
> I had assumed you'd rather maintain a stable strip util which you can
> use on kernel modules than rework your module builds. I guess not.
To dig an old thread up, but what really is wrong with the original ELF
section stuff? Why encode "magic" values on the end of the kernel
module that then require all userspace tools to be modified in order to
properly handle this?
When I first did this so many many years ago an elf section made it so
easy to handle. Userspace didn't need to be modified, and everyone
knows how to handle elf sections, even the kernel does :)
And I think we really want the ability to have multiple signatures, the
whole "chain of trust" thing that is needed will work out much better if
multiple signatures are allowed. Putting it in an elf section allows
this to work out easier, right?
confused,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-06-22 1:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-05-22 23:02 [PATCH 00/23] Crypto keys and module signing David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 01/23] Guard check in module loader against integer overflow David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 02/23] KEYS: Move the key config into security/keys/Kconfig David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 03/23] KEYS: Announce key type (un)registration David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 04/23] KEYS: Reorganise keys Makefile David Howells
2012-05-22 23:02 ` [PATCH 05/23] KEYS: Create a key type that can be used for general cryptographic operations David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 06/23] KEYS: Add signature verification facility David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 07/23] KEYS: Asymmetric public-key algorithm crypto key subtype David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 08/23] KEYS: RSA signature verification algorithm David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 09/23] Fix signature verification for shorter signatures David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 10/23] PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 11/23] PGPLIB: Basic packet parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 12/23] PGPLIB: Signature parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:03 ` [PATCH 13/23] KEYS: PGP data parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 14/23] KEYS: PGP-based public key signature verification David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 15/23] KEYS: PGP format signature parser David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 16/23] KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 17/23] MODSIGN: Provide gitignore and make clean rules for extra files David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 18/23] MODSIGN: Provide Documentation and Kconfig options David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 19/23] MODSIGN: Sign modules during the build process David Howells
2012-05-22 23:04 ` [PATCH 20/23] MODSIGN: Provide module signing public keys to the kernel David Howells
2012-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH 21/23] MODSIGN: Module signature verification David Howells
2012-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH 22/23] MODSIGN: Automatically generate module signing keys if missing David Howells
2012-05-22 23:05 ` [PATCH 23/23] MODSIGN: Panic the kernel if FIPS is enabled upon module signing failure David Howells
2012-05-23 12:51 ` [PATCH 00/23] Crypto keys and module signing Rusty Russell
2012-05-23 14:20 ` David Howells
2012-05-24 12:04 ` Rusty Russell
2012-05-24 14:00 ` David Howells
2012-05-27 5:41 ` Rusty Russell
2012-05-31 14:11 ` David Howells
2012-05-31 15:35 ` Josh Boyer
2012-06-04 1:16 ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-04 13:38 ` Josh Boyer
2012-06-05 0:23 ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-22 1:53 ` Greg KH [this message]
2012-06-22 3:29 ` Lucas De Marchi
2012-06-22 4:05 ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-22 11:03 ` David Howells
2012-06-23 0:20 ` Rusty Russell
2012-05-25 11:15 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-05-25 11:37 ` David Howells
2012-05-25 13:08 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-25 13:53 ` David Howells
2012-05-25 14:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-05-25 12:18 ` David Howells
2012-05-25 15:42 ` David Howells
2012-06-04 1:31 ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-04 12:47 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-06-05 1:05 ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-05 11:39 ` Mimi Zohar
2012-06-05 13:37 ` David Howells
2012-06-05 14:36 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
2012-06-05 13:35 ` David Howells
2012-06-10 5:47 ` Rusty Russell
2012-06-11 8:30 ` Kasatkin, Dmitry
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