From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756729Ab2I1DLF (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Sep 2012 23:11:05 -0400 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]:53793 "EHLO youngberry.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754850Ab2I1DLD (ORCPT ); Thu, 27 Sep 2012 23:11:03 -0400 Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2012 22:10:56 -0500 From: Serge Hallyn To: Matthew Garrett Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 01/10] Secure boot: Add new capability Message-ID: <20120928031056.GA5478@sergelap> References: <1348152065-31353-1-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> <1348152065-31353-2-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1348152065-31353-2-git-send-email-mjg@redhat.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Quoting Matthew Garrett (mjg@redhat.com): > Secure boot adds certain policy requirements, including that root must not > be able to do anything that could cause the kernel to execute arbitrary code. > The simplest way to handle this would seem to be to add a new capability > and gate various functionality on that. We'll then strip it from the initial > capability set if required. > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn > --- > include/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++- > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h > index d10b7ed..4345bc8 100644 > --- a/include/linux/capability.h > +++ b/include/linux/capability.h > @@ -364,7 +364,11 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { > > #define CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND 36 > > -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND > +/* Allow things that trivially permit root to modify the running kernel */ > + > +#define CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL 37 > + > +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL > > #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) > > -- > 1.7.11.4 > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html