From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Romain Francoise <romain@orebokech.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Linux 2.6.32.60
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2012 14:46:06 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20121017214606.GD7083@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20121012063848.GD12041@1wt.eu>
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 08:38:48AM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 07:11:12AM +0800, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> > On 10/11/2012 07:31 PM, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> > > On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 07:58:04PM +0900, Greg KH wrote:
> > >> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 08:29:16AM +0200, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> > >>> If you think these patches constitute a regression, I can revert them.
> > >>> However I'd like convincing arguments since they're here to help address
> > >>> a real issue.
> > >>
> > >> If I missed these when doing the random number generation backport for
> > >> 3.0, and I should add them there as well, please let me know.
> > >
> > > At least I think they should not be in 2.6.32 without being in 3.0.
> > > Probably that Peter's opinion will help us decide whether they should
> > > go into 3.0 or 2.6.32 should revert them.
> > >
> >
> > I would strongly argue for at least one of the RDRAND-enabling versions
> > being in all supported kernels; the second (with Ted Ts'o's changes) is
> > better, but touches a *lot* of subsystems; the plain one is
> > self-contained but only helps RDRAND-enabled hardware.
> >
> > Without these patches the random subsystem has a critical security flaw,
> > which puts it into the scope for stable.
>
> That's clearly what I understood, thanks Peter for confirming ! So I won't
> revert the patches unless a regression is reported in which case we'll
> prefer to fix it.
>
> Greg, I think it would be better to get them into 3.0 too. The ones I used
> were (prefixed with 'X' if they are already in 3.0) :
> 24da9c26 x86, cpu: Add CPU flags for F16C and RDRND
This showed up in 2.6.36
> 7ccafc5f x86, cpufeature: Update CPU feature RDRND to RDRAND
This showed up in 3.0
> X 63d77173 random: Add support for architectural random hooks
> X bd29e568 fix typo/thinko in get_random_bytes()
> 628c6246 x86, random: Architectural inlines to get random integers with RDRAND
> 49d859d7 x86, random: Verify RDRAND functionality and allow it to be disabled
I've now queued up these two as they were relevant here.
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-10-17 21:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-10-09 9:44 Linux 2.6.32.60 Willy Tarreau
2012-10-10 14:05 ` Romain Francoise
2012-10-11 6:29 ` Willy Tarreau
2012-10-11 10:58 ` Greg KH
2012-10-11 11:31 ` Willy Tarreau
2012-10-11 23:11 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-10-12 6:38 ` Willy Tarreau
2012-10-12 6:42 ` Greg KH
2012-10-17 21:46 ` Greg KH [this message]
2012-10-11 18:09 ` Romain Francoise
2012-10-11 18:29 ` Willy Tarreau
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