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Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2012 15:56:35 +0000
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@gmail.com>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
Message-ID: <20121031155635.GA14294@srcf.ucam.org>
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1) Gain root.
2) Modify swap partition directly.
3) Force reboot.
4) Win.

Root should not have the ability to elevate themselves to running 
arbitrary kernel code. Therefore, the above attack needs to be 
impossible.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org