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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, ellyjones@chromium.org
Subject: [PATCH] devtmpfs: mount with noexec and nosuid
Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2012 16:20:16 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20121117002016.GA13493@www.outflux.net> (raw)

Since devtmpfs is writable, make the default noexec nosuid as well. This
protects from the case of a privileged process having an arbitrary file
write flaw and an argumentless arbitrary execution (i.e. it would lack
the ability to run "mount -o remount,exec,suid /dev"), with a system
that already has nosuid,noexec on all other writable mounts.

Cc: ellyjones@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 drivers/base/devtmpfs.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/base/devtmpfs.c b/drivers/base/devtmpfs.c
index 147d1a4..b7e2e57 100644
--- a/drivers/base/devtmpfs.c
+++ b/drivers/base/devtmpfs.c
@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ static int handle_remove(const char *nodename, struct device *dev)
 int devtmpfs_mount(const char *mntdir)
 {
 	int err;
+	int mflags = MS_SILENT | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOSUID;
 
 	if (!mount_dev)
 		return 0;
@@ -347,7 +348,7 @@ int devtmpfs_mount(const char *mntdir)
 	if (!thread)
 		return 0;
 
-	err = sys_mount("devtmpfs", (char *)mntdir, "devtmpfs", MS_SILENT, NULL);
+	err = sys_mount("devtmpfs", (char *)mntdir, "devtmpfs", mflags, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "devtmpfs: error mounting %i\n", err);
 	else
@@ -368,11 +369,12 @@ static int handle(const char *name, umode_t mode, struct device *dev)
 static int devtmpfsd(void *p)
 {
 	char options[] = "mode=0755";
+	int mflags = MS_SILENT | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOSUID;
 	int *err = p;
 	*err = sys_unshare(CLONE_NEWNS);
 	if (*err)
 		goto out;
-	*err = sys_mount("devtmpfs", "/", "devtmpfs", MS_SILENT, options);
+	*err = sys_mount("devtmpfs", "/", "devtmpfs", mflags, options);
 	if (*err)
 		goto out;
 	sys_chdir("/.."); /* will traverse into overmounted root */
-- 
1.7.9.5


-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

             reply	other threads:[~2012-11-17  0:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-11-17  0:20 Kees Cook [this message]
2012-11-17  0:27 ` [PATCH] devtmpfs: mount with noexec and nosuid Greg Kroah-Hartman
2012-11-17  0:34   ` Kees Cook
2012-11-17  0:39   ` Kay Sievers
2012-11-19 18:14     ` Kees Cook
2012-11-19 23:55       ` Roland Eggner
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2021-12-22 12:50 Muhammad Usama Anjum

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